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MENTAL DISEASE AND CRIMUNAL
RESPONSIBILITY
JERo E HALL*
The literature on insanity in relation to criminal responsibility is re-
plete with paradox. The rules are of the simplest formulation: a harm
committed as a result of serious mental disease is not a crime; yet their
meaiings have been disputed more than any other in the penal law.
Many psychiatrists are very harsh critics of the rules, yet they attack
each other's theories even more vehemently. In this country they seem
to present a united front in a sweeping condemnation of the criminal
law, but English psychiatrists usually praise their law and its administra-
tion. There is an almost universal belief that insanity can be recognized
by ordinary laymen, yet experts disagree in many cases-all the while
insisting that they, alone, are qualified to decide this question. The
psychological theories adduced are said to be discoveries of the present
century, yet they bear a curious proximity to very ancient ideas con-
cerning the human mind. In this abundant realm of polemics, progress,
and confusion, where it is literally true that any position can be sup-
ported by learned treatises, it is impossible to arrive at definitive results.
It is possible, however, to understand what is involved in "an adequate
analysis of the problem, and thus to achieve a valid appraisal of the
relevant rules of law. We shall omit consideration of those lesser rules
that postpone the trial and the execution of the sentence, for the prob-
lems they raise are not difficult ones, despite the fact that occasional
sophisticates have ridiculed delaying execution of a penalty until the
restoration of sanity-they have not understood the moral import of the
criminal law. The major problems concern criminal responsibility, i.e.,
mental disease at the time a harm was committed.
The logic of the insanity plea in this connection is simple enough,
and it was clearly restated by Coke :1 the implication of mens rea is mens
* The writer is pleased to acknowledge the very helpful research of Ruth
Smalley, Student Research Assistant, Indiana University Law School.
1. Beverley's Case, 4 Co. 123b, 124b, 76 Eng. Rep. 1118, 1119 (K. B. 1603); cf.
PULTON, DE PACIs REGis ET REGNI (1609) No. 36 at 125b; and State v. Noel, 102
N. J. L. 659, 680, 694, 133 AtI. 274, 285 (1926).
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sana; if the defendant is "insane" the requisite of criminal intent can not
apply. It is apparent, therefore, that insanity as a defense to a crim-
inal charge raises important questions of fact. Among the facts de-
scribed in the hypotheses (behavior-circumstances) of the rules are
those concerning the person of the actor; specifically relevant are those
facts that concern his mental "capacity" and, therefore, his being held
legally accountable. There are no peculiar "legal" theories regarding the
facts that are significant in these connections. Instead, traditional, com-
mon-sense ideas and judgments are represented in the legal rules. Thus,
too, the criminal law does not embody distinctively legal ideas regarding
the psychology of mental disorder. The rules refer to certain factual
situations; the meanings of these situations are determined by reliance
upon various types of empirical knowledge.2 When such knowledge
becomes "sufficiently" established to warrant this dependence is ob-
viously indefinite, hence debatable. For reasons usually accepted, the
official tendency has been one of hesitation and delay-it is hardly the
function of this institution to embrace the newest discoveries. But, on
the whole, the judicial practice in this respect, though overly cautious,
is essentially that of scientists themselves: a consensus of the experts is
the criterion of truth (or of its recognition, if one prefers).
The M'Naghten Rules
An analysis of this problem requires a critical appraisal of the
major decisions in the light of relevant empirical knowledge-especially
psychology. In all common law jurisdictions it is agreed that The Queen
v. M'Naghten3 is easily the most important case on the subject. In 1843,
immediately after the acquittal, on the ground of insanity, of M'Naghten,
who had been tried for a sensational murder, a number of questions con-
cerning this defense were addressed to the Lord Justices. After lengthy
debate, they arrived at certain conclusions regarding the relevant sub-
stantive and procedural law. 4  With minor modifications, these rules
have continued to this day to comprise the most important part of the
law on insanity in relation to criminal responsibility. Of the several
rules then published, the most important one, countlessly reiterated in
succeeding decisions, is the following:
".. . to establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly
proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was
2. Judge Doe's opinion in State v. Pike, 49 N. H. 399 (1870), though ques-
tionable in other respects, is still one of the best judicial discussions of this problem.
3. 10 Cl. and F. 200, 4 St. Tr. (m.s.) 847, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
4. On the whole decision see Dr. Sheldon Glueck's detailed study, MENTAL
DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1925). This treatise may be profitably con-
sulted on the entire problem indicated in the title.
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labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not
to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it,
that he did not know he was doing what was wrong."'
It is this doctrine that raises the fundamental questions concerning the
relation of mental disease to the criminal law.
The judges who formulated the M'Naghten Rules did not regard
them as innovations; rather they were published as "restatements" of
law long in vogue in England as well as in this country.6 To laymen as
well as to the vast majority of lawyers, the Rules have seemed sound
and efficient instruments to determine the important issues involved.
Their survival for more than a century in many countries is a further
index of their validity. Yet, almost from the day they were published
the Rules have been subjected to an unremitting criticism by medical
men and psychologists. This criticism reached its peak in this country
in the present century as a phase of the rise of psychoanalysis. Although
those of its exponents who have concerned themselves with the criminal
law constitute only a small percentage of their profession, and a still
smaller one of general practitioners and psychologists, yet they are spe-
cialists of high competence whose opinions deserve careful considera-
tion. A brief survey of their criticism will reveal not only the gap be-
tween the existing law and certain expert opinion; it will also indicate
the chief issues to be analyzed.
From the practically limitless outpouring of such criticism, it will
suffice to select that of three of the most representative psychiatrist-
5. 10 Cl. and F. 200, 210, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843).
6. The M'Naghten Rules were a synthesis of Rex v. Arnold, 16 How. St. Tr.
695 (1724) ; Ferrers' Case, 19 How. St. Tr. 886 (1760) ; Hadfield's Case, 27 How.
St. Tr. 1282 (1800) ; and Bellingham's Case (1812) 1 COLLmNSON, A TaFTISE ON
THE LAW CONCERNING IDIOTS, LUNATICKS AND OTiiER PERsoNs NON CouoPOTEs
MENTIS (1812) 636. In Ferrers' case the Solicitor General, purporting to summar-
ize Hale, stressed: "a faculty to distinguish the nature of actions; to discern the
difference between moral good and evil. . . ." Id. 948. In Hadfield's case, Erskine
minimized the "right and wrong" test and emphasized knowledge of the nature of
the act. In Bellingham's case, Mansfield said: "If a man were deprived of all
power of reasoning, so as not to be able to distinguish whether it was right or
wrong to commit the most -wicked transaction, he could not certainly do an act
against the law." 1 COLLINSON, op. cit. supra at 671. It will be noted that the
M'Naghten Rules modified this by focussing the test on the particular harm com-
mitted, rather than on knowledge of right and wrong "in general." Cf. "To excuse
a man in the commission of a crime, he must at the period when he committed the
offence, have been wholly incapable of distinguishing between good and evil, or of
comprehending the nature of what he was doing. . . ." Id. at 474. Cockburn's
argument in defense of M'Naghten contains an excellent summary of the earlier
leading cases and of the medico-legal treatises. 4 St. Tr. (N.s.) 872-892. Shortly
after the M'Naghten Rules were announced, and apparently without having seen
them, Shaw, C. J., held: "In order to be responsible, he must have sufficient power
of memory to recollect the relation in which he stands to others, and in which
others stand to him; that the act he is doing is contrary to the plain dictates of
justice and right, injurious to others, and a violation of the dictates of duty."
Commonwealth v. Rogers, 7 Metc. 500, 502 (Mass. 1844).
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critics of the criminal law. One of these, a pioneer in criminal psy-
chiatry and one of Freud's first American disciples, was the spearhead
of a strident attack on the criminal law. "Here," he wrote "it [psy-
chiatry] meets with antiquated, outworn, archaic ways of thinking that
have been crystallized in the statutory law . . . ;7 the criminal law and
methods of legal procedure are based upon concepts which are largely
obsolete from his [the psychiatrist's] point of view. . . . The right and
wrong test . . . represent antiquated and outworn medical and ethical
concepts . . whereas the question of responsibility carries with it a
metaphysical implication. . . The remedies [especially punishment]
upon which the law seems to repose its faith are hangovers, as it were,
from old theological and moral ideas that have survived their period of
usefulness in this twentieth century civilization."8  In his first major
publication in this field, this psychiatrist asserted that the law "per-
sistently refuses to acknowledge the existence of actual facts, . . . it
continues to operate as if those facts really did not exist at all. '0
In this grave charge of stubborn neglect of fact and scientific knowledge,
he was joined, among others, by a prominent psychiatrist of the same
persuasion, who, after like criticism of neglect of "recognized knowl-
edge," observed reassuringly that "There is, however, no reason to ex-
pect the law to ignore entirely facts of science which are widely accepted
by those familiar with the data."' 0  On another occasion the latter at-
tacked "that hoary old legal dogma, the presumption of sanity ;"" and
he concluded that "the framework of the criminal law still savors too
much of the medieval to be brought readily into rapport with psychiatric
concepts of the present day.' 2 These criticisms have been often re-
peated, recently by a psychiatrist who, taking up the same cause, also
finds it "thoroughly illogical" to entrust the determination of the issue of
insanity to laymen.1 3 This most recent, prolific exponent of these views
summarized the general position of his school of psychiatry thus: "We
all seem to agree that the law as it stands is bad. Its deficiences are
obvious even to its enlightened technical defenders .' 14 Reverting to the
7. WHITE, TWENTIETH CENTURY PSYCHIATRY (1936) 110.
8. White, The Need for Cooperation between the Legal Profession and the
Psychiatrist in Dealing with the Crime Problem (1927) 7 AM. J. PsYcHnIAT. 493,
494, 495.
9. WHITE, INSANITY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1923) 99.
10. Overholser, Psychiatry and the Law-Cooperators or Antagonists? (1939)
13 PSYCHIAT. Q. 622, 625.
11. Overholser, The Place of Psychiatry in the Criminal Law (1936) 16
B. U. L. Rzv. 322, 329.
12. Id. at 343.
13. ZLDOoRG, Legal Aspects of Psychiatry, in ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMEzi-
CAN PSYCHIATRY 1844-1944 (1944) 513.
14. Zilboorg, Misconceptions of Legal Insanity (1939) 9 Am. J. Onrnorsy-
CHiAT. 540, 543.
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M'Naghten Rules in an indulgent, imaginary lecture to lawyers, he
counselled: "abandon your formalistic and tenacious adherence to this
principle."'
It is obvious that the above sharp criticisms challenge not only well-
established doctrines regarding the rules on insanity but also fun-
damental principles of penal liability. These views, expressed with com-
plete certitude by recognized specialists, have greatly impressed many
persons, including, not least, legal scholars who, in praiseworthy efforts
to improve the criminal law, have accepted them as scientific knowledge.
It is essential, therefore, to evaluate this criticism. It is necessary to in-
quire into the nature of the intellectual arsenal commanded by these
doughty psychiatrists, in short, to appraise the -discipline they represent.
The evaluation of the "status" of any discipline in the hierarchy of
empirical knowledge is not an arbitrary matter; there are definite criteria
that determine the validity of such judgments. Thus it could be shown
by analysis of the literature comprising psychology that that discipline is
certainly not a science in any even moderately rigorous sense. 16 This,
however, is not a significant criticism of a social science,' 7 though it may
be noted when false and honorific presumption is encountered. More to
the point is that even when appraised by reference to standards that are
relevant to its subject matter, much of current psychology falls far below
reasonable expectation-as may be shown briefly by persuasive secondary
criteria: the lack of agreement among psychologists on almost every im-
portant question, the existence of many "schools" of psychology, the
15. ZILOORG, MIND, MEDICINE, AND MAN (1943) 279. This same writer, in
his HISTORY OF MEDICAL PSYCHOLOGY (-with Henry) (1941), fills many pages de-
voted to conflicts between physicians and "the law," in which the latter is invariably
cast in the role of an evil, malicious spirit barring the psychiatrists' road to prog-
ress. But if one reads this book carefully, it appears that not only lawyers but the
vast majority of medical men were also opposed to the new discoveries. Thus the
criticism is reduced to strident complaint of the Bar because it did not lead the
medical profession on questions in the latter's own special field. To this, as a fur-
ther correction should be added, e.g., the graphic first-hand account of Dr. Hill re-
garding his struggle to stop, chaining and other barbarous treatment of the insane.
Writing on his efforts to reform, he states: ". . . I had the whole medical world
against me .... At length Mr. Sergeant Adams came to the rescue as my advocate,
and by his powerful aid . . . the system was no longer a dream but a success."
HILL, LUNACY (1870) 43-44. Knowledge of such contributions by lawyers to many
fields of learning, and especially to psychology (which could be multiplied in-
definitely) provides corrections that are needed not only for valid appraisal of the
legal process, but, even more, as a prerequisite to the establishment of decent con-
ditions of collaboration between the professions. More adapted to attain that very
important goal, cf. ". . .as doctors we have been needlessly unjust, and have not
sufficiently taken into consideration the fact that the lawyers in stating their case
and opinion have based it on the medical knowledge of the period." Henderson,
Psychiatry and the Criminal Law (1930) 4 PSYcHiAT. Q. 103, 104-5. Also see id.
at 109.
16. Cf. MICHAEL AND ADLER, CRnEm, LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE (1933) 55-65.
17. See the writer's chapter, Criminology, in TWENTIETH CENTURY SOCIOLOGY
(Gurvitch and Moore, Eds. 1945).
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inability of any one of these to win very wide support among competent
persons outside psychology, and the persistence in informed circles, of a
traditional, though changing body of psychological thought. These gen-
eralizations merely summarize the views of competent psychologists,
themselves 8
But many of the most important advances have been made in psy-
chiatry, which is especially important in the criminal law. Dissension
here, however, is more acute than elsewhere, and the validity of this
branch of psychology is no less challenged. "The best psychiatry is still
more of art than of science," writes a recognized expert.'0 "There are,
in fact, many methods, standpoints, views and convictions which are all
at war with one another," states Jung ;20 and these limitations are reg-
ularly reflected in enormous divergencies in diagnosis.21 A competent
practitioner admits "the debatable character of many theories,"22 while
a forthright investigator concludes that "no critically minded person
practiced in scientific research or in disciplined speculation can accept
psychoanalysis on the basis of the writings of Freud or of any of his
followers. The presentation of facts is inadequate; the speculation is
irresponsible; verifications are lacking; conclusions are hastily arrived
at, and concepts are hypostatized." 23  Finally, it is admitted that, with
some exceptions, "there has been no real psychiatric insight into crimin-
alistic behavior. '2 4 In such circumstances one can hardly conclude that
18. Thus: "It would be gratuitous to pretend that psychologists as a body are
agreed on many fundamental issues." OGDEN, THE MEANING OF PSYCHOLOGY
(1926) xx. A continental scholar: "No other science is so 'problematic' as psy-
chology. There is, in fact, almost no question in psychology which is settled in the
way that many questions in mechanics or in biology, for instance, are settled."
DRIEscH, THE CRISIS IN PSYCHOLOGY (1925) ix. Cf. Scheler, quoted in CAsSIRE,
AN ESSAY ON MAN (1944) 22. And a leader in American psychology also con-
cudes that ". . . while controversies and debated questions are frequent in all the
sciences, schools such as we have been considering seem almost peculiar to psy-
chology." WOODWORTH, CONTEMPORARY SCHOOLS OF PSYCHOLOGY (1931) 214. See
also, HEmDBRDaR, SEVEN PSYCHOLOGIES (1933) 3,425; and especially, the excellent
summarization by GRIFFITH, PRINCIPLES OF SYSTEMATIC PSYCHOLOGY (1943) vii-
viii.
19. Sullivan, Psychiatry (1934) 12 ENcYC. Soc. Sc. 580.
20. MODERN MAN IN SEARCH OF A SOUL (1939) 33. Cf. "Psychopathology
is a speculative subject, whose limits remain undefined. . . . There is much divi-
sion of opinion among psychopathologists on basic principles." Coleman, Psycho-
pathology (1944) 90 J. MENT. Sci. 152.
21. E.g., "Whereas Dr. Adler finds only twelve cases of 'mental disease . . .
out of 413 individuals examined at the Pontiac Reformatory, Dr. Hickson finds
240 cases of mental disease . . . out of 464 cases examined in the Chicago morals
court. . . . Curious, too, are the figures from Philadelphia's morals court. About
the same time that Dr. Hickson was finding 50% of his street-walkers afflicted
with dementia praecox, Dr. Leopold, in Philadelphia, could unearth less than % of
1% from his 1924 examinations." Hussey, Psychiatrists in Court (1931) 22 AMs.
MERCURY 342, 346.
22. HORNEY, NEW WAYS IN PSYCHOANALYSIS (1939) 8.
23. Murray, Psychology and the University (1935) 34 ARCH. NEUROL. AND
PsYCHIAT. 803, 809.
24. ABRAHAMSEN, CaIa AND THE HUMAN MIND (1944) 26.
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psychiatrists who summarily dismissed well considered criticism 25 have
exemplified the best scientific procedure. If these psychiatrist-critics of
the criminal law would recognize the serious limitations of their dis-
cipline they might be induced to study the criminal law regarding mental
disorder.
In any event, if the conditions of scientific knowledge are under-
stood, there is no reason to repudiate the above estimate of the present
status of psychiatry. The limits of precision and the criteria of validity
of empirical knowledge are determined largely by the nature of the sub-
ject matter. That which is common to both law and most psychologies
includes various "inner states" such as thinking, feeling, wishing, de-
ciding, and the like-and these are not easily explored. Only the ex-
ternal movements are observed; the relevant mental states are "induced"
as necessary, and they are validated collaterally, e.g., by introspection,
by their probability in relation to what is observed, by various techniques
of testing and by psychoanalysis. In most psychologies such internal
states comprise highly important data; in psychiatry they concern the
central problems-most mental diseases reveal no somatic pathology but
are wholly functional. These data are relatively uncertain; they are dis-
coverable only by indirection, and some of them, e.g., "the unconscious,"
require very elaborate techniques to become known.
The severe criticism of the criminal law by various psychiatrists has
spread the illusion that the chief difficulty, the major obstacle in the way
of adequate adjudication, is a traditional legal indifference to Science.
But the plain fact is that the chief limitation on any solution of the prob-
lems arising from mental disease is the lack of medical and psychiatric
knowledge of mental disease. The criminal law can do no more than util-
ize the best psychology available concerning the relevant facts. This means
that there is an inevitable margin of error in administration of the crim-
inal law, and that the most important way to improvement of it is to
improve psychiatry. Certainly no one who has studied the problem of
mental disease in relation to criminal responsibility can be content with
either the present rules or their administration. But wisdom in this
matter inheres not in strident criticism of the rules, but in an acute
awareness of their. deperidence on empirical knowledge and of the un-
certainties that abound when the object of that knowledge is the human
mind.
Closely related to the above are certain aspects of the language prob-
lem, especially the frequent criticism by psychiatrists of legal terminol-
25. See Overholser, supra note 11, at 328, for remarks on Professor Michael's
thoughtful criticism; and on Professor Dession's sympathetic and informed an-
alysis, see Overholser, Some Possible Contributions of Psychiatry to a More Effec-
tive Administration of the Criminal Law (1939) 17 CAN. B. R-v. 638, 653.
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ogy. This is said to be vague and ambiguous; particularly is it com-
plained that tle terms do not refer to data and theories with which the
psychiatrist deals-hence he is handicapped in assisting at the trial of the
insanity issue. The first criticism need not be considered-it concerns
an inevitable consequence of the nature of the subject-matter and of the
imprecision of psychology. 'As regards the latter criticism, various prob-
lems are raised, including the function of technicality in any discipline
and the presence there, also, of accumulated professionalisms. The
above criticism can be discussed here only with reference to the specific
ground relied upon to support it. Thus a psychiatrist who is a frequent
critic of legal terminology insists that the "rules are unintelligible to me.
. . ."26 He adds: "When they [lawyers] ask me whether the defendant
in the dock is in my opinion insane, I must candidly state, if I am to re-
main true to my professional knowledge and faithful to my oath, first,
that I do not understand the question, and second, that since I don't
understand the question I do not know whether the defendant is insane
or not."' z  The like alleged inability to understand what is meant by
"responsibility" and other legal terms is often met in similar writing.
The sophistry of such criticism is indicated in the prevailing prac-
tices of numerous psychiatrists who have participated in the trial of in-
sanity cases for a great many years. They have regularly "translated"
the legal terms into the language of their discipline, and they have also
restated their expert opinions in the usage of the courts. Thus they
have understood that the rules refer to (a) certain mental disorders of
accused persons, (b) the medico-psychiatric knowledge regarding them,
and (c) relevant directions regarding what must be done by officials.
The speciousness of the above criticism of legal terminology is further
disclosed if one considers the direct substitution of the language of
psychiatry for that now employed in the rules. Here, too, one meets
both ambiguity and technicality-but with a difference! Thus, on the
one hand, there is surely no term in penal law that approximates the
ambiguity of "psychopathic personality,' '28 the commonest coin in the
entire psychiatric exchange; and there are many other terms almost
equally ambiguous that are regularly used in psychiatry. As regards
technicality, a much more glaring evil is encountered. Imagine that,
instead of a judge's instruction in terms of the prevailing rules, he said
. essential to the psychopathic personality may be a defective or-
26. ZMBOORG, MIND, MEDICINE, AND MAN (1943) 274.
27. Id. at 272.
28. "The only conclusion that seems warrantable is that, at some time or other
and by some reputable authority, the term psychopathic personality has been used
to designate every conceivable type of abnormal character." Curran and Mallin-
son, Psychopathic Personality (1944) 90 J. MENT., Sci. 278.
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ganization of the autotely ... and an unsatisfactory adjustment to the
heterotely .... -29 If, instead of "knowledge" or "understanding,"
"control" and "act", the language of the law ran in terms of id, ego, and
super-ego, the psychiatrists would understand; but would many lay per-,
sons be much enlightened even after they were informed that the "id" is
"the true unconscious ;" that the "ego" is that part of the mind that "is
regulated by the reality principle"; and that the "super-ego" is "a sort of
inner monitor, synonymous with conscience . ." ?30
The claim of inability to collaborate because of language difficulties
arises from an obvious error-the assumption that rules of law, to be
adequate, must be stated in terms of the various sciences and disciplines
primarily concerned with the relevant factual knowledge. It is only
necessary to recall that any language exists for the purpose of communi-
cation (the "emotive" function may here be ignored) to apprehend the
fallacy underlying the claim of any specialist that legal rules should be
couched in his particular vocabulary. Legal rules and principles are in-
tended primarily for the guidance of laymen and officials-of the former
not only as citizens but also as triers of facts in litigation. The auxiliary
jurisprudential analysis and the rules of procedure are exclusively the
lawyer's instruments. Even if the former limitation on the use of
technical language could be ignored, it would still be necessary to use
terms that lawyers understand-it happens that the job in hand is theirs
and not the psychiatrists'. Certainly it must be recognized that the
quality of adjudication depends, in part, on the contribution of psychia-
try; but this does not indicate the desirability of formulating the rules
of law in the language of that discipline. It merely requires some effort
by the experts to define certain legal terms in meanings of their own
specialities.31
Thus the prerequisite to any valid criticism of the law on mental
disease and penal responsibility is an understanding of the difficult na-
ture of the factual data involved, of the limitations of available em-
pirical knowledge, and of the consequent imprecision of the relevant
language. In light of the perspective thus attained, it is possible to ar-
rive at definite conclusions regarding the solution of the instant problem.
Of first importance is that the legal scholar can not accept any
psychology "on authority"; he can not escape the arduous task of form-
ing his own judgment regarding the "best" psychology-as is recog-
nized by psychologists, themselves, who, on rare occasion, have studied
29. KAHN, PSYCHOPATHIC PERSONAITIES (1931) 57.
30. KAHNr, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND NEUROLOGICAL. DF Irrio rs AND THE UN-
coNscious (1940) 98, 86, 136.
31. Cf. Linton, Foreword to KARDINER, THE INDIVIDUAL AND His Socr=(1939).
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the distinctive tasks of adjudication.0 3 2 Thus he must remember, as
some legal scholars seem not always to have done, that the legal system
is itself a vast reservoir of invaluable psychology-perhaps of the sound-
est psychology available.33 Nextly, and closely related to the above, is
that considerable body of psychology that has survived and changed
through the ages, the psychology of common intelligence and experience,
the "living psychology," as it has been happily termed,34 as distinguished
from that of the laboratories and the text-books. Finally, but by no
means of any lesser importance, are the current technical psychologies,
especially, psychiatry. For it would be indefensible to permit the mis-
placed importunities of psychiatrist-critics of the prevailing law to en-
gender a reciprocal mistake. Psychiatry can' make a very considerable
contribution to the criminal law on mental disease and responsibility;
any adequate analysis of the problem must devote careful attention to
the relevant knowledge that is there provided.
In these circumstances, the seeker after psychologic truth will do
well to turn briefly, at least, from the conflict of the contemporary
schools to the past, where ". . . for centuries, long before 'scientific'
psychology had reduced man to a purely rational puppet, religion and
philosophy had represented the real psychology of people and indi-
viduals. 13 5 Especially as regards obvious mental abnormality the his-
tory of psychology dates from the earliest records ;31 we learn from
Westermarck of the practically universal recognition of serious mental
disorders among primitive peoples.37 These crude beginnings should
not be ignored, but from a modern critical viewpoint, the contributions
of the Greeks are of major importance. Indeed, with Plato the ultimate
psychological notions that have guided the succeeding development of
the discipline become definitely formulated. Perhaps the most funda-
mental and enduring of these is the division of human nature (or con-
duct) into the "rational" and the "irrational." This was Plato's primary
classification ;38 but he also established the tripartite division of psy-
32. The legal scholar must "throw himself into psychology completely enough
to become his own competent critic on matters of psychological theory." ROBINSON,
LAW AND THE LAWYERS (1937) 111.
33. "Dealing as it does mainly with human behavior, the law very likely has
more to teach psychology than to learn from it. The law has had a long history
and very able students and practitioners." THORNDIKE, MAN AND His WORKS
(1943) 133.
34. RANK, BEYOND PSYCHOLOGY (1941) 27.
35. Id. at 34.
36. E.g., "David changed his behavior before them, and feigned himself mad."
For other Biblical references see MAUDSLEY, RESPONSIBILITY IN MEINTAL DISEASE(1874) 51. Cf. 2 ANCIENT LAws AND INSTITUTES OF ENGLAND (Thorpe ed., 1840)
236, 237; and DIGEST 1.18.14.
37. 1 WSTERMARCK, ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE MORAL IDEAS (2nd'
ed. 1912) 269-277.
38. REPuBLiC, 439.
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chology, corresponding to cognition, conation and feeling (intelligence,
volition, emotion).30 This division was not rigorously adhered to by
Plato and it would be futile to consider to what extent his exposition is
equivalent to the apparently corresponding ones of modern psychology.
More significant is Plato's insistence that the rational principle ought to
rule the passions.40 He recognized that such control was the normal
state, hence his exculpation of madmen from penal, but not civil, liabil-
ity.41 Aristotle's psychology is much more complex and systematized. 42
He viewed the human "soul" ("mind" or "self") as a unitary being,
functioning in certain modes-the nutritive, sensitive, conative, locomo-
tive, and rational.43 In Aristotle, also, the rational powers are held para-
mount, and this view of human nature, both as actual and as ideal, be-
came the central thesis of mediaeval psychology, culminating in
Aquinas.4 This tradition, emphasizing certain attributes of human con-
duct, and underlining the supremacy of intelligence has endured to the
present day.45 There have been many changes in terminology and a vast
increase in factual knowledge. But these have, for the most part, deep-
ened and extended the traditional psychology, not invalidated it.40 Thus,
e.g., Freud's clarification of the conflict between instinct and super-ego
implements the perspective achieved by Plato; on the other hand, where
his doctrines have been most seriously attacked, where, indeed, psy-
choanalysis has been definitely repudiated in the past decade, one recog-
nizes the perdurance of the essential principles of the traditional psy-
chology.
A few specific theories of this "living psychology," simplified for
convenient handling and relevant to both legal exculpation and mitiga-
tion, are: (a) the various functions of the mind (or "self") are actually
integrated, hence the tripartite and other classifications of the mental
39. For a brief summary, see Shorey, The Unity of Plato's Thought (1903)
6 Cmic. DEC. PUB., 1sT. SERIES, 42-43; and 1 JowEr, DIALOGUES OF PLATO (3rd
ed. 1892) 410.
40. REPUBLIC, 441; LAwS, bk. v, § 734. "A modern writer treats this tension
as a relation between inherent impulses and acquired forms of restraint. The Greek
formulates this condition as a conflict between desire and reason, but the difference
in meaning is not great." BRETT, PSYCHOLOGY ANCIENT AND MODERN (1928) 107.
41. LAWS, bk. ix, § 857-859.
42. See HAMMOND, ARISTOTLE'S PSYCHOLOGY (1902).
43. DE ANIMA, 414 at 31-32.
44. See BRENNAN, THoMIsTIc PSYCHOLOGY (1941).
45. "If we open almost any modern text-book of psychology, we shall find mind
divided into 'Intellect, feeling, and will' . . ." Nichols, Origin of Pleasure and Pain
(1892) 1 PHa.os. REv. 404. ". . . the three aspects of all mental process-the
cognitive, the affective, and the conative aspects; that is . . .a knowing of some-
thing or object, a feeling in regard to it, and striving towards or away from that
object." MCDOUGALL, INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (4th ed. 1911) 26-27.
Cf. as representative of contemporary psychology, BENTLEY, THE NEw FIELD OF
PSYCHOLOGY (1934).
46. See notes 40 supra and 50 infra.
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processes are analytical devices; (b) the central problem of human con-
duct results from a never-ceasing battle between the blind drives of in-
stinct and intelligence; (c) within limits and "normally," intelligence
prevails; and (d) mental disease involves the impairment of the ra-
tional functions. In terms of these traditional theories, supplemented by
the critical insights of contemporary psychology, 'the rules of penal
liability have taken form and are interpreted and administered. Thus
the rules imply that in "normal" adults intelligence controls instinctual
drives-at least to the extent of effecting avoidance of serious harms;
that there is a moral and legal obligation to exercise such control; but
that such control may be lost or impaired by strong passion or by various
types and degrees of mental disease-hence the sanctions ranging from
mitigation (manslaughter instead of murder; lighter penalties for the
"semi-responsible") to complete exculpation (defense of insanity).
With some fair appreciation of the enduring psychology represented in
the criminal law for many centuries; in light of the fact, occasionally
recognized by distinguished psychologists, 47 that the process of adjudi-
cation has involved detailed case-studies and acute critiques of contem-
poraneous psychology by highly competent observers to whom many
records of like proceedings have been available; and, finally, by aid of
the knowledge supplied by expert witnesses representing various cur-
rent psychologies, it is possible to appraise the general arguments of
the psychiatrist-critics of the criminal law, set out above.
To come directly to close grips with that criticism we may note the
specific issues raised in a report by a Committee of the American
Psychiatric Association, thus: "Various curious tests then had to be de-
cided upon to determine the 'responsibility' of persons suspected of
'insanity' (i.e., of an 'irresponsible insanity'). Once they were com-
pared in appearance and conduct with wild beasts, later with the men-
tality of a 14-year-old child. This was actually the criterion of 'responsi-
bility' in use in courts not so many years ago. Current even today in
many states is the slightly less hoary 'right and wrong' test. .... ,,48
That these views comprise an indiscriminating depreciation of earlier
psychology, including that represented in classical legal treatises and
judicial decisions, can easily be shown. Admittedly, a valid historical
criticism can not be achieved without effort, e.g., Hale's belief in witch-
craft is joined to a very shrewd appraisal of theories of mental disease;
popular demonology is countered by importaht insights into the nature
of insanity; an age of enlightenment condones a vicious, barbaric treat-
47. THORNDIE, supra note 33.
48. Menninger, Medicolegal Proposals of the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion (1929) 19 J. CR. L. & CRIMINOL. 374.
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ment of mentally diseased persons in institutions that make the peni-
tentiaries mild by comparison. But the need of painstaking historical
exploration to discover accurate, significant findings on these matters
does not condone gross distortion.
The first "curious" test of insanity noted above is the so-called
"wild beast test." This language was employed by Bracton in the 13th
century, and his remarks on the subject were quite brief. "A madman,"
he said, "is one who does not know what he is doing, who is lacking in
mind and reason, and who is not far removed from the brutes." In
dealing with the civil obligations of such persons, he said, "a madman is
not of sane mind, so that he cannot discern or has no discretion at all.
For such persons do not differ much from brutes who are without rea-
son. . . . "9 Certainly a schizophrenic is not a wild beast; but neither
did Bracton allege that he was. He was simply repeating, in a literary
phrase, the doctrine that man is distinguishable from other animals by
his intelligence. The above caricature of Bracton's usage is typical of a
like, common distortion of the psychology of his time.50 That, at least
from the 13th century onwards, fhere was considerable knowledge of-
mental disease represented in the criminal law, is apparent from The
Mirror,0' the statute Praerogativa Regis52 and the classical law writers.53
This is especially true of Hale, whose discussion is both well-informed
and critical.54 Following Bracton, he wrote that insane persons cannot
be guilty "for they have not the use of understanding, and act not as
reasonable creatures, but their actions are in effect in the condition of
brutes;" the metaphor became common.-5 Disregarding this back-
49. 6 BRAcroN, DE LEGIBUS (Twiss ed.) f. 420b, 321.
50. Some fair insight into the bizarre historicism of the contemporary critics
of the criminal law may be attained in a brief glance at the contributions of a con-
temporary of Bracton-the Monk, Bartholemeus Anglicius who wrote De Pro-
prietatibus Rerum about 1240. Concerning his kliscussion of mental disease, an
American psychiatrist, who took pains to inform himself, writes: "One is struck by
the modernity of his viewpoint .... If one transposes some of the words into
modern terms, there results a statement which reads like a discussion encountered
in a modern textbook of psychiatry ... The treatment that Monk Bartholemew
prescribed was equally rational .... His portrayal of the depressive patient is
quite accurate according to present-day clinical standards." BROMBERG THE MIND
OF MAN (1937) 39-40, 40, 41.
51. SELDEN SOc. (1895) 136.
52. Circa 1324. See 1 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, H. E. L. 481.
53. See, generally, Crotty, The History of Insanity as a Defense to Crime in
English Criminal Law (1924) 12 CALIF. L. REV. 105.
54. E.g., after noting Fitzherbert's tests of idiocy (inability to count to 20 or
recognize parents or tell one's age) he adds circumspectly, "These, tho they may be
evidences, yet they are too narrow and conclude not always; . . ." 1 HALE, P. C. 29.
55. Id. 31-32. Cockburn, in his defense of M'Naghten, spoke of "that disease
... which deprives man of reason, and converts him into the similitude of the
lower animal. . . ." Queen v. M'Naughton, 4 St. Tr. (N.s.) at 874 (1843). In a
small treatise on the subject published in 1700 (BRAYDALL, NON COMPOS MENTIS)
the professional literature up to that time is well reviewed. The author discusses
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ground, the current psychiatrist-critics of the Rules in all solemnity lay
the "wild beast test" at the door of Judge Tracy.r0 But any even casual
examination of his opinion reveals how extreme has been the penchant
for distortion of the psychology of the criminal law. The defendant
shot a man without any rational motive. There was testimony strongly
indicating serious mental disease, but there was also much evidence to
support a contrary finding. Judge Tracy made a careful summary of
the law and evidence, in the course of which he said:
" .. that is the question; whether this man hath the use of his reason and
sense? If he . . . could not distinguish between good and evil, and did not
know what he did .... he could not be guilty of any offense against any law
whatsoever; ... On the other side, . . . it is not every kind of frantic humour
or something unaccountable in a man's actions, that [exculpates] ; it must be a
man that is totally deprived of his understanding and memory, and doth
not know what he is doing, or more than an infant, than a brute, or a wild
beast, such a one is never the object of punishment; therefore I must leave it
to your consideration, whether [the defendant] . . . knew what he was doing,
and was able to distinguish whether he was doing good or evil, and under-
stood what he did ..... "' 0
On conviction, the defendant was sentenced to be executed, but this was
modified, and he was imprisoned for some thirty years until his death.
The court's language may, no doubt, be criticized from a modern psy-
chiatric viewpoint, but it should not be pretended that the arbitrary
literalism regarding a wild *animal represents the meaning actually con-
veyed or that this was really an 18th century test of insanity.
It would be easy to describe the judicial use of other criteria such as
the "14-year-old test;" but the facts thus established would merely be
cumulative. They reveal, among other important knowledge, a clear
recognition of serious mental disease, that the distinction between the
feeble-minded and the psychotic is a very old one, and that various attri-
butes, persuasive to intelligent laymen and supported by the contem-
pbrary medical psychology, were selected to guide judgment. But we
must attend in some detail to the criteria -presently employed in the two
major clauses of the M'Naghten Rules; and firstly to that which the
above report of the Committee of the Psychiatric Association termed
"the slightly less hoary right and wrong test."
That the "right and wrong" test58 is a vestige of a naive psy-
the now familiar grounds for exculpation: that the punishment of an insane person
"tannot be an example to other;" and, also, on legal principle, the harm was com-
mitted "without a felonious intent or purpose." Id. at 75.
56. Rex. v. Arnold, 16 How. St. Tr. 695 (1724).
57. Id. at 764-765.
58. This test is commonly said to have been originated by Hawkins who wrote
of "a natural disability of distinguishing between good and evil, as infants under the
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chology, that psychiatrists "do not believe it helps to call an act .. .
bad . . "59 that "such knowledge [of morality] is not an important
factor in deciding a question of mental illness . . ." are representative
opinions of the psychiatrist-critics of the Rules. They are commonly sup-
ported by the claim that "any number of the obviously and unquestion-
ably mentally ill and insane have' a keen perception of right and wrong;
in fact, frequently a perception more keen and more puritanical than
that of the average run of normal people."' 0 It is important to note, at
once, the sharp dissent from this appraisal by other psychiatrists. Thus
one of the leaders of modern psychiatry insists that "The moral attitude
is a real factor in life with which the psychologist must reckon if he is
not to commit the gravest errors."' 1 In this position, he is supported by
a steadily increasing number of psychiatrists. 2
The above criticism of the "right and wrong" test, though stressing
other aspects of conduct, parallels the atomistic psychology of "moral in-
sanity" introduced into English psychiatry by Prichard, 63 and in the
United States by Ray.6 That theory signified that certain individuals
were completely lacking in "conscience" but were otherwise unimpaired.
A very extensive literature was devoted to minute analyses of these
"amoral" persons. After a careful survey of these studies, Healy, in
the light of his own investigations, concluded that "we have been con-
stantly on the look-out for a moral imbecile, that is, a person not sub-
normal and otherwise intact in mental powers, who shows himself devoid
of moral feeling. We have not found one . . . .the person who failed
to appreciate his moral duties was the person who had not intelligence
enough to realize what was best for even himself as a social being ..
if the 'moral imbecile' exists who is free from all other forms of intel-
lectual defect, he must indeed be a rara avis."65 Healy's findings are
not only persuasive in terms of the theory of' "integration of the self" ;""
age of discretion, ideots and lunatics" (1 P.C.1-2), but it is evident that Hawkins
merely received this from Hale (1 P.C. 25) who, himself, probably took it from a
much older literature.
59. White, supra note 8, at 502.
60. McCarthy and Maeder, Imsanity and the Law (1928) 136 THE ANNALS
131.
61. JUNG, op. cit. supra note 20, at 224.
62. E.g., KAHN, op. cit. supra note 29, at 65; and see infra p. 713 et seq.
63. A TREATISE ON INSANITY AND OTHER DISORDERS AFFECTING THE MIND(1835).
6'4. A TREATISE ON THE MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY (1838). Cock-
burn, in his defence of M'Naghten, drew heavily on Ray, pronouncing his book
" . . the most scientific treatise that the age has produced upon the subject of in-
sanity in relation to jurisprudence ..... Queen v. M'Naughton, 4 St. Tr. (N.s.)
878 (1843).
65. HEALY, THE INDIVIDUAL DELINQUENT (1927) 783, 788. So, also, Lowrey,
Delinquent and Criminal Personalities, in 2 PERSONALITY AND THE BEHAVIOR Dis-
oRDERs (ed. Hunt, 1944) 801.
66. See infra pp. 707-710, 717-718.
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they also implement the M'Naghten Rules. This view of the participa-
tion of the rational functions, including evaluation, in normal conduct
does not imply any depreciation of the role of the instincts. For, con-
sistently with this theory, one asserts the fusion of thp various aspects
of the self. This means that moral judgment ("knowledge of right and
wrong") is not reified as an outside, icy spectator of a moving self ; on
the contrary, the corollary is that value-judgments are permeated with
the color and warmth of emotion-as is evidenced by the usual attitudes
of approval that coalesce with right decisions.6 7 Indeed all action, espe-
cially that relevant to the penal law, involves a unified operation of the
personality, e.g., a normal person who fires a bullet into the body of a
human being knows simultaneously what he is doing and that it is highly
immoral. The M'Naghten Rules provide an analytical device for dis-
secting this action.
But, primarily, this clause of the Rules reflects the traditional, com-
mon-sense doctrine that man is a moral being, that he is "sufficiently"
autonomous to render moral judgments by him and about his conduct
defensible and useful. Certainly so far as the criminal law is concerned,
this ethical theory is readily validated. For there (and especially re-
garding those wrongs where the defense of insanity is raised) no nice-
ties are involved. Only the elementary social interests are in issue. The
conclusions that emerge from the above analysis of the "right and
wrong" test are that man exhibits his distinctive nature not only in the ab-
stractions he creates and in the symbolic form he gives to them but also
that the most characteristic of all his generalizations is the moral judg-
ment. Accordingly, this clause in the M'Naghten Rules represents neither
a "hoary superstition" nor an adventitious phrase, spontaneously coined,
but an abiding insight into what is paramount in human nature. As will
appear shortly, the criticism of the "right and wrong" test by the above
psychiatrist-critics represents a phase of modern Positivism, and it also
involves the "irresistible impulse" test. The above analysis of that criti-
cism of the "right and wrong" test will be supplemented by placing it in
the indicated broader context where the implications of such criticism
for criminal law theory are easily revealed. 68
The other major clause of the M'Naghten Rules refers to "knowl-
edge," "nature" and "quality." These terms represent not only ultimate
ideas of epistemology; they also designate primary common-sense no-
tions of daily life. While the philosophers have discussed these ideas
67. Cf. Karpman, Criteria for Knowing Right from Wrong (1941) 2 J. Clmu.
PSYCHOPATH. 377, 379, 386; Prideaux, The Criminal Responsibility of the Alleged
Insane (1923) 1 CAmB. L. J. 319, 320-321. Also, see citations in footnotes 176-181
infra.
69. See infra pp. 710-717.
"MENTAL DISEASE AND CRIME
with vast erudition and in technical vocabularies, the judges have talked
about them very simply. Their expositions have relied, partly, on specific
illustration usually based on the facts in issue, e.g., Judge Darling's ob-
servation, "He knew the nature and quality of his act; for he knew that
he was shooting, and that this shooting would kill her."69 They have
also substituted terms which they regarded as synonyms, e.g., for
"know": "appreciate," "comprehend rationally," "judge," "understand,"
"perceive," "be aware of," "conscious of," and the like. The opinions
have dealt more fully with the other terms--"nature" and "quality" 7 0 -
and the chief issue has been whether they are synonymous or distin-
guishable.7 ' It has been held that "in using the language 'nature and
quality' the judges were only dealing with the physical character of the
act, and were not intending to distinguish between the physical and
moral aspects of the act." 72  But some American courts have so dis-
tinguished the two terms. 73 In support of this view, it has been argued
that the, judges who formulated the M'Naghten Rules "could not have
intended two different words to mean exactly the same thing."74  But
most judges have not even tried to distinguish the terms. Attempts at
elucidation have been largely confined to the substitution or addition of
such words as "consequences," "character and consequences," "effect,"
"implications," or "significance." This treatment of the two terms as
synonymous is defensible on practical grounds inasmuch as the other
principal clause of the Rules, discussed above, deals explicitly with
moral judgment. It would therefore seem to facilitate interpretation of
the Rules if evaluation were restricted to that clause and not also identi-
fied with "quality" in the other one. But this argument and the preva-
lent, general holdings are implications of a basic fallacy; namely, that
understanding the "nature" of an act is actually a separate process from
knowing that it is right or wrong. In fact, these two forms of under-
standing coalesce.
69. Rex v. Pank, London Times, May 22, 1919, p. 9, col. 3, quoted by DAVIS
AND WILSHIRE, MENTALITY AND THE CRI INAL LAW (1935) 95-96.
70. Cockburn said, "What is meant by 'the nature and quality of the act' I really
do not know." Letter to A.-G. on Draft Code of 1879 quoted (1943) 21 (CAN. B. R.
at 431. Cf. WEIHOFEN, INSANITY AS A DEFENSE IN CRIMINAL LAW (1933) 43-44;
GLUECK, op. cit. supra note 4, at 215-216; Barnes, A Century of the McNaghten
Rules (1944) 8 CAMB. L. J. 300, 303.
71. Oppenheimer argued that neither word ought "to be rejected as mere sur-
plusage." He distinguished the terms on the ground that "nature" refers to the
physical character; "quality" to the "social and legal character;" "wrong" or
,criminality," to the "legal significance of the act." THE CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
op LU NATICS (1909) 142-148. Cf. Foote, K. C., for the appellant in R. v. Codere, 12
Cr. App. R. 21, 24-25 (1916).
72. Reading, J., in R. v. Codere, 12 Cr. App. R. 21, 26-27 (1916).
73. E.g., Schwartz v. State, 65 Neb. 196, 91 N.W. 190 (1902) ; cf. DAVIS AND
WuLsHn, op. cit. supra note 69, at 113.
74. Id. at 95-96.
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It is impossible here to engage upon any extended discussion of the
meanings of. these ultimate notions that comprise the subject matter of
half a philosophical library. But we may glance briefly in two significant
directions which are closely related to the instant problem-to psy-
choanalysis and to common sense. Psychiatrists who profess inability
to understand what is meant by "knowledge of the nature and quality of
the act" accept, as a criterion of normality, the "correctness of the
reality-testing. ' 7  The reference is to the important Freudian "reality-
principle." 76  It is possible to equate this principle with the legal test.
Thus both the M'Naghten Rule and the Freudian "reality-principle" as-
sume the existence of an outer world3 7  Both assume "nature events"
and "social events" which occur in that world. 78  Both assume the pos-
sibility of knowledge of that world.79 Both correlate these relationships
and functionings with "mental abnormality."80  Both imply that there
are methods by which the "knowledge of the outer world" can be
75. See Hacker, The Concept of Normality and Its Practical Significance
(1945) 15 Am. J. ORTiOPsYcHIAT. 47, 52.
76. "This more far-seeing attitude of controlling intelligently the instinctual
demands in accordance with the requirements of the given external situation is the
reality principle." ALEXANDER AND HEALY, ROOTS OF CRIME (1935) 276. Cf. "A
loss of reality must be an inherent element in psychosis; . . . the new phantastic
outer world of a psychosis attempts to set itself in place of external reality." 2
FREUD, COLLECTED PAPERS (1924) 277, 282.
77. "Let us, moreover, bear in mind the great practical importance there is in
the capacity to distinguish perceptions from mental images. . . .Our whole atti-
tude toward the outer world, to reality, depends on this capacity so to distinguish,"
4 FREUD, COLLECTED PAPERS (1925) 147; See also, BRILL, FREUD'S CONTRIBUTION
To PsYcHIATRY (1944) 139; HiNsiE & SHATZKY, PsYcHrATRIc DicTIoNARY (1940)
460.
78. For the recognition given to the social event as distinguished from the
nature event, see, e.g. Sterba, Introduction to the Psychoanalytic Theory of the
Libido (1942) 68 NERvous AND MENTAL DISEASE MONOGRAPH SERIES 69; Alex-
ander, The Psychoanalysis of the Total Personality (1930) 52 NERvoUS AND MEN-
TAL DISEASE MONOGRAPH REVIEW 125-126; Laforgue, The Relativity of Reality
(1940) 66 NERvouS AND MENTAL DISEASE MONOGRAPH SERIES 4, 37, 39, 49-50.
"In a way, the ego pursues the same aims as the id, but by virtue of its knowl-
edge of the outer world, it takes account of its lawfulness and regularity, and in-
stead of permitting the id to run blindly into dangerous situations, the ego inter-
poses reason between the desire and the act." BRILL, op. cit. supra note 77, at 155; ef.
2 STEPHEN, HIST. CR. L. OF ENG. (1883) 174. See.also, 4 FREUD, COLLECTED PAPERS
(1934) 18.
79. See BRILL, op. cit. supra note 77. "... we use the term ego where is com-
monly meant the intellect." Laforgue, supra note 78, at 37. Similarly, Ferenezi,
Stages int he Developnent of the Sense of Reality in CONTRIBUTIONS To PSYCHO-
ANALYSIS (1916) 233-234.
80. "Schizophrenics see the world differently; our notion of reality is not
theirs. We call them 'crazy' because they see and perceive things we do not see
and which to us appear absurd." Laforgue, supra note 78, at 40; ". . . neurosis does
not deny the existence of reality, it merely tries to ignore it; psychosis denies it
and tries to substitute something else for it." 2 FREUD, COLLECTED PAPERS (1933)
279. See also, id. at 250-51, 277.
MENTAL DISEASE AND CRIME
tested8 and that this is the function of intelligence.8 2  The "reality-
principle" has been defined in almost the very words of the legal Rule,
as "the apprehension of the true nature of an object. . . . "8 Indeed a
reading of Erskine's argument in the Hadfield Case reveals the practical
identity of the legal and psychiatric principles.8 4  But even a slight ac-
quaintance with the literature of philosophy will persuade almost any-
one that the authors of the M'Naghten Rules achieved a vast improve-
ment over both Erskine and Freud, in avoiding the term which has as
good a claim as any other to being the vaguest of all words-"reality."
It is therefore not unlikely that most modern scholars, knowing that
term to be pregnant with the limitless equivocations of hundreds of years
of speculation, would prefer the simpler language of the judges.
Despite their uncertainty (which, concerning common transactions,
is often very desirable), the basic terms that comprise the M'Naghten
Rules have a core of univocal meaning and an underlying consistency
that are adequate in daily life. The accepted premises of rational action
include a concept of causal connections between events and the naming
of the events in specific ways.85 "Awareness" of the event-sequence
presupposes generalization on action, projecting into the future the
regularities of the past."6 The standard for verification is external and
implies social conformity in the relevant areas. Thus the Rules refer to
the elementary relationships of man to his environment; they pose, on
the simplest level, the relationship of knower to known. And they say,
in effect, that when a person's mind is so diseased that his powers of
sensation, perception and abstraction function very defectively, he is not
responsible. The import of this judgment is most readily seen in con-
nection with perception. If, after checking against error of various
sorts, an adult does not correctly perceive such objects as a gun, knife,
81. "... the ego takes a perception for real if its reality is vouched for by the
mental faculty which ordinarily discharges the duty of testing the reality of things."
FREUD, GROUP PSYCHOL GY (1922) 77. See also, Schilder, Introducton to a Psy-
choanalytic Psychiatry (1928) 50 NERvouS AND MENTAL DISEASE MONOGRAPH
SERtES 19.
82. ". . . intelligence is the capacity for acquiring, absorbing and using knowl-
edge of reality." Podolsky, Psychoanalytical Views of Intelligence (1941) 28 Psy-
CHOANAL. REv. 359.
83. Wdlder, in 20 IMAGo (1934) 467.
84. E.g. The disease consists "in the delusive sources of thought; all their
deductions within the scope of the malady, being founded upon the imnioveable
assumption of matters as realities, either without any foundation whatsoever, or so
distorted and disfigured by fancy. . . ." He spoke of delusions as "where imagina-
tion . . . holds the most uncontrollable dominion over reality and fact. . . ." 27
How. St. Tr. 1281, 1313 (1800). He distinguished Hadfield from Ferrers' Case,
19 How. St. Tr. 886 (1760)-the latter exhibited "violent passions and malignant
resentments, acting pon real circumstances. . . ." id. at 1314; cf. PoPE, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW AND PRACrICEs OF LUNACY (2d ed. 1890) 2.
85. Cf. 1 KANTOR, PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC (1945) 187.
86. See BRIDGMAN, THE INTELLIGENT INDWVIDUAL AND SOCIETYr (1938) 41.
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human being, etc., he is grievously disordered. But it is clear that the
rule is not limited to perception of external objects; it also includes the
various other characteristics of intelligent functioning, 7 especially un-
derstanding of ordinary relationships and of the usual consequences of
simple actions.
"Irresistible Impulse"
Viewed historically, there can be little doubt that the M'Naghten
Rules represented an intellectualistic psychology.88 In addition, a fal-
lacious "faculty psychology," ably expounded by Cockburn,8 9 the de-
fendant's counsel, was reflected in the disjunctive statement of the two
principal clauses of the Rules. The psychiatrist-critics of the law, un-
initiated into the processes and techniques whereby the legal system
changes and is improved, have assumed that the Rules fully represent
the present law. Actually, what has happened is that modern psychiatry
has been greatly utilized in adjudication, its findings being held relevant
to the given legal formulas; in short, the M'Naghten Rules have been
"liberally" interpreted in recent years°-hence the rather general ap-
proval of them by English psychiatrists who have studied their opera-
tion."' It is conceded, however, even by the staunchest supporters of
the M'Naghten Rules, that their defense requires much reliance on the
actual practices of the courts as well as on executive review and modifi-
cation of sentences. This implies that the Rules can be substantially im-
proved.
The major questions regarding reform of the Rules have become
centered on the theory of "irresistible impulse." That theory does not
coincide with the rise of modern psychiatry; it is said to have been "fully
87. See STODDARD, THE MEANING OF INTELLIGENCE (1943) 4.
88. The dominant general psychology was represented by MILL, ANALYSIS OF
THE PHENOMENA OF THE HUMAN MIND (1829). The word, "emotion," or any
equivalent term hardly appears in that work; it presents, on the whole, a severely
rationalistic psychology.
89. 4 St. Tr. (N.s.) 847, 887 (1843).
90. "It seems true to say that in. cases where there is evidence of real mental
disease, antecedent to the commission of the alleged crime, and there is no evidence
of a motive which might influence a sane person, juries have no difficulty in finding
either that the prisoner did not appreciate the nature of his act, or that he did not
know that it was wrong." Hewart, 57 H. L. DEB. (5th Ser. 1924) 468. See H. M.
Advocate v. Sharp, S. C. (J.) 66 (1927).
91. "Various attempts have been made to modify in some way or other the
M'Naghten rules, but I do not believe that any better criterion has ever been
formulated, provided these rules are interpreted in a broad and liberal spirit, as is
mostly the case today." Henderson, supra. note 15, at 115. So, too, East, Delin-
quency and Crime (1944) 90 J. MENT. SC. 391; EAST, INTRODUCriON TO FoRENsIC
PsYCHIATRY (1927) 73-74; MacNiven, Psychoses and Criminal Responsibility in
MENTAL ABNORMALITY AND CRIME (Radzinowicz and Turner eds. 1944) 9, 70;
for a like view by American psychiatrists, see McCarthy and Macder, sup'ra note
60, at 132, and CLECxLEY, THE MASK OF INSANITY (1944) 288-289.
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and clearly stated by Weyer" in the 16th century.9 2 For the psychological
foundation of the present controversies, the work of certain French phy-
sicians in the early 19th century is most important. Pinel, one of these
pioneers of modern psychiatry, diagnosed cases of manie sans d~lire
where he found no loss in the functioning of perception or intelligence
but, nonetheless, a compulsion to violence, even homicide. His theory
was first repudiated in England, Dr. Burrows characterizing it as "both
absurd and dangerous . .. absurd, because he who can perpetrate such
acts, and yet be in possession of all these faculties, is neither in a delirium
nor mad. . . -93 But the "irresistible impulse" theory gained ground,
aided in England by Prichard's diagnosis of "moral insanity" which, he
reported, left the reasoning faculties unimpaired,94 and, in the United
States, by Ray's like position.m9 5 Based upon this theory, shortly after the
M'Naghten Rules were published, a detailed argument advocating their
reform concluded that ". . . this should be the test for irresponsibility
-not whether the individual be conscious of right and wrong-not
whether he had a knowledge of the consequences of his act-but whether
he can properly control his action !"96 The greatest influence on the gen-
eral attitude of psychiatrists on this question, as well as that of many
lawyers, was probably Maudsley, who presented his diagnosis of "im-
pulsive insanity" so persuasively as to enlist a support that has grown to
this day.9 7 The current psychiatrist-critics of the law, finding the above
theory quite congenial to their views of human behavior, especially re-
garding the pervasive, dominating drive of the instincts, made it the
rallying-point of their attack on the Rules. "
To understand what is involved in the proposed "irresistible im-
pulse" test it is essential to keep definitely in mind the supporting psy-
chological theory that many insane (psychotic) persons, while under-
standing the significance of their conduct and knowing what is immoral,
are, nonetheless, unable to control their actions; they are "irresistibly
impelled" to certain conduct. The important implications of this hypoth-
esis as regards the prevailing law are manifest; they constitute a radi-
cal challenge by asserting that many persons (some psychiatrists say
most persons) who are indubitably insane do not fall within the orbit of
the M'Naghten Rules. Ultimately, therefore, the question turns on the
validity of the psychological theory of "irresistible impulse."
92. ZILBOORG AND HENRY, A HISTORY OF MEDICAL PSYCHOLoGY (1941) 243.
93. BuRRows, COMMENTARIES ON INSANITY (1828) 267.
94. Op. cit. supra note 63.
95. Op. cit. supra note 64.
96. KNAGGs, RESPONsIImrry IN CRIMINAL LUNACY (1854) 69.
97. MAUDSLEY, RESPONSIBILITY IN MENTAL DIsEASE (1874) 133 et seq. After
one of the cases described by him, he concluded: "In face of this example of un-
controllable morbid impulse, with clear intellect and keen ioral sense, what be-
comes of the legal criterion of responsibility ?" Id. at 136.
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It is futile to attempt to decide the issue by authority, for the spe-
cialists disagree; the Freudians support Maudsley and his predeces-
sors ;9s other psychiatrists strongly oppose this view ;9 and still others
hold that the problem lies outside the scope of their discipline. Even the
Freudians disagree among themselves at important points. Thus most of
them accept the hypothesis of a "sense of guilt" as comprising or giving
rise to a compulsion to commit a harm in order to be punished,0 0 but
others insist that this is not supported by "clinical material."',' Any in-
dependent effort to determine the validity of the theory of "irresistible
impulse" encounters the sort of difficulty discussed above, i.e., "there ap-
pears to be no clear-cut agreement as to its exact meaning . - . . the im-
pulse is in most instances capable of being resisted .... -lO2
The problem may be more accurately formulated by an examina-
tion of relevant judicial opinion. The leading early cases in the United
States, that are frequently cited as representative of the above test, are
Commonwealth v. Roger' 03 and Commonwealth v. Mosler.0 4 In the
Rogers Case, Chief Justice Shaw stressed both the intellectual and the
volitional aspects of conduct. Though his language is ambiguous,1°5 it is
clear enough to indicate definitely that he did not adopt the "irresistible
impulse" test.'06 He not only stressed disorder of reasoning as well as
knowledge of right and wrong but, in addition, when he did speak of
impulse, it was always in its relation to disease of the intelligence. 107 In
tile passage which is sometimes relied upon to show his adoption of the
"irresistible impulse" test, he said, "the question will be, whether the
98. E.g. ZLBOO=RG, op. cit. supra note 26, at 273. But cf. this same psychiatrist's
discussion of "knowledge," citation in note 158 infra.
99. "It is impossible to say, in any particular case, that an impulse was irresis-
tible; all that can be said is that the impulse did not appear to have been success-
fully resisted." HAMBL N SMITH, PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL (2d ed. 1933) 179.
Cf. ". . . the difficulty of distinguishing between uncontrollable impulse and the im-
pulse which is not controlled would make too fertile a dialectical field." Henderson,
supra note 15, at 114.
100. E.g. ABRAHAMSEN, CRIME AND THE HUMAN MIND (1944) 32.
101. Karpman, Criminality, The Super-Ego and the Sense of Guilt (1930) 17
PSYCHOANALYT. REv. 280, 288; cf. Nunberg, The Sense of Guilt and the Needfor Punishent (1926) 7 INT. J. PSYCHOANAL. 420.
102. Spirer, The Psychology of Irresistible ImPulse (1943) 33 J. CR. L. &
CRIMINOL. 458.
103. 7 Metc. 500 (Mass. 1844).
104. 4 Pa. 264 (1846).
105. See Professor Keedy's excellent analysis of it in Insanity and Criminal
Responsibility (1917) 30 HARv. L. REv. 724, 725-729.
106. Dr. Glueck, an advocate of the "irresistible impulse" test, concedes that
the decision "might therefore, be distinguished from the usual version of the ir-
resistible impulse test ... " Glueck, Psychiatry and the Criminal Law (1928) 14
VA. L. REv. 155, 163.
107. E.g., "... if his reason and mental powers are either so deficient that he
has no will . . . " supra note 103, at 501. See also his general statement of the
test, supra note 6.
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disease existed to so high a degree, that for the time being it over-
whelmed the reason, conscience, and judgment, and whether the pris-
oner, in committing the homicide, acted from an irresistible and uncon-
trollable impulse. ... ."108 If the meaning of the "irresistible impulse"
test, stated above, is referred to this passage and to the broader context
of the entire opinion, it is abundantly clear that the advocates of that test
can derive no comfort from the Rogers decision.
But the Mosler case did adopt the "irresistible impulse" theory. In
his decision, Justice Gibson strongly supported the psychology of separ-
ate faculties, including the theory of "moral insanity" that had recently
been expounded by Ray.10 9 But he cautioned the jury so vigorously re-
garding it: that it is "dangerous" and "can be recognised only in the
clearest cases,""u 0 that a conviction of murder in the first degree was re-
turned. Thus the full, official imprimatur of the "irresistible impulse"
test in this country was not signalized until many years later, by Judge
Somerville's opinion in Parsons v. State.J" Here the theory was pre-
sented in detail and strongly endorsed.
To what extent the "irresistible impulse" test has been adopted in
this country cannot be stated with any assurance. It has been claimed
that 17 American states have adopted it" 2 but an examination of cases
cited in support'"a definitely indicates that this is highly questionable.
Many of these cases are of the same type as Commonwealth v. Rogers,
i.e., they reveal not adoption of the independent "irresistible impulse"
test as a sufficient alternative to the M'Naghten Rules, but, instead, hold-
ings that ability to control conduct is a phase of normal intelligence. 114 It
108. Id. at 502. Italics added. This same theory of integration is repeated. Id.
at 503.
109. "Insanity is viental or noral; the latter being sometimes called homicidal
mania .... But there is a inoral or homicidal insanity, consisting of an irresistible
inclination to kill, or to commit some other particular offence. There may be an
unseen ligament pressing on the mind, drawing it to consequences which it sees,
but cannot avoid, and placing it under a coercion, which, while its results are clearly
perceived, is incapable of resistance." 4 Pa. 264, 266-267 (1846).
110. Id. at 267.
111. 81 Ala. 577 (1886). So, too, State v. Green, 78 Utah 580, 6 P.(2d) 177
(1931).
112. WEiHoFEN, op. cit. supra note 70, at 44.
113. Id. The States are listed id. at 16 n. 6.
114. E.g., the earliest cases cited (id. at 46-47) as adoptions of the "irresistible
impulse" test: State v. Thompson, 90 Wright Ohio Rep. 622 (1834) and State v.
Clark, 12 Ohio Rep. 483, 495 (1843). In the former, Judge Wright's instruction
identified "the power of discriminating" good from evil with the power to control.
In the latter case, there is language which, taken from its context, could support the
claim. But, interpreted in its context, it is clear that Judge Birchhard's views were
in accord with his predecessor's. The plain implication again was that the answer
to the question regarding control by the defendant was included in the answer to the
question, did the defendant know right from wrong? It is clear that his instruction
did not contemplate an affirmative answer to the latter question and a negative one
to the question on control. If there were any doubt regarding the meaning of h"-
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is also frequently asserted that European codes invariably recognize the
"irresistible impulse" test. But this, too, is very doubtful despite the fact
that the language of some codes supports such a view.11 For the courts
have frequently interpreted the provision concerning "freedom of will"
as an implicate of normal intelligence. 116 Many European penal codes
were enacted in the early 19th century; hence those which do recognize
the "irresistible impulse" test reveal the continuing influence of Pinel's
outmoded theory. As regards these, it appears, e.g., by reference to re-
cent English administration of the Rules, that this is an instance of the
superiority of case-law.
The entire problem of insanity in relation to criminal responsibility
received careful analysis thirty-some years ago by a distinguished Com-
mittee 1 7 which proposed legislation to substitute for the M'Naghten
Rules, the lack of "the necessary criminal intent" by reason of insanity.
The recommendation thus stressed impairment of intelligence as the
paramount criterion of mental disease,"" the Committee believing that
"irresistible impulse" could be subsumed under the proposed formula." 0
But this would not be acceptable to those who urge the adoption of a
separate "irresistible impulse" test since that test assumes concomitant
unimpaired intelligence. More recently, however, the trend in the litera-
ture on this problem has gone strongly in favor of adoption of the "irre-
sistible impulse" test'2°--a tribute, no doubt, to the influence of the Posi-
tivist School of Criminology in this country, as well as of the prestige of
psychoanalysis here. But there is little evidence that more than a few
courts have repudiated the traditional Rules; instead, the tendency has
been to interpret them more soundly in reliance upon such valid psy-
chiatry as has been available.
The English experience regarding the "irresistible impulse" test
has paralleled the American-with certain striking differences. There has
instruction, the, questions he asked the witnesses would be conclusive as to this
interpretation. State v. Clark, supra at 485. (In 70 A. L. R. 659 at 676, Ohio is
classified with states which do not recognize the "irresistible impulse" test, the
Clark case cited.)
115. See OPPENHEIMER, op. cit. supra note 71, Ch. 2.
116. Id. at 88. Thus Mannheim, who apparently supports the "irresistible im-
pulse" test, reports that in 1929, the German Supreme Court held, "The free deter-
mination of the will is excluded when, its a consequence of mental disturbances, cer-
tain ideas and feelings or influences dominate the will to such a degree as to exclude
the possibility of determining the will through reasonable considerations." Mann-
heim, The Treatment of Mental Disorders and Mental Deficiency in Continental
Criminal Law (1938) 84 J. MENT. Sci. 526.
117. Of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, Edwin
IFeedy, Chairman. The first report was published in (1910) 1 J. CR. L. & CRIMINOL.
3 4; reprinted, (1917) 30 HAgv. L. Rxv. 536.
118. Id. at 523-524.
119. See id. at 546-550.
120. GLu.cK, op. cit. supra note 4, at 479; Wzmormr, op. cit. supra note 70, at
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been much less judicial support of that test in England; moreover, Eng-
lish psychiatrists who have had experience in administration of the crim-
inal law are opposed to the adoption of the "irresistible impulse" test.1 21
One finds, to be sure, the same sort of wishful interpretation-that many
English judges have adopted the "irresistible impulse" test.122 Thus,
even Hadfield's Case is cited as an example.12.3 But there was not the
slightest mention of that test in the decision, and Erskine actually re-
stricted the possibility of using it by his approval of the decision in
Ferrers' Case. His great contribution was a clarification of the meaning
of delusion-and thus of the importance of disease of the intelligence, to
which almost his entire argument was confined. So, too, a phrase in Den-
man's opinion in Oxford's Case'T is clipped from its context and inter-
preted as the adoption of the "irresistible impulse" test.' 5 But there can
be no doubt on any reading of Denman's opinion that it does not contain
the slightest support of that interpretation. Instead "the power of con-
trolling himself" is equated with or subsumed under the possession or
power of reason. A definite adoption of the irresistible impulse test, indeed
one of the very few unequivocal ones, is found in McCardie's instruction
in the trial of True's Case,12 6 but this was disapproved on appeal ;127 it
was shortly afterwards repudiated as utterly "fantastic.' 1 28 Thus, so far
as English judges are concerned, it is a fair characterization to say, as
Hewart, C.J., put it, that they have "but coquetted with that proposal.' 129
In contrast to the judiciary, various Commissions have been favor-
ably inclined toward adoption of the "irresistible impulse" test.' 30 The
last of these was Lord Atkin's Committee. Its report' 3 ' reveals a curious
difference of opinion between the legal members, the representatives of
121. E.g., MAcNivEN, op. cit. supra note 91, at 71, and HENDERSON, op. cit. supra
note 15. There is also a substantial body of like expert opinion in the United States.
See note 145 infra. But it has been so little emphasized in recent years that the field
here seems to be entirely occupied by the proponents of the test. The present Ameri-
can situation, of harsh criticism of the criminal law, is reminiscent of the English
one at the time of Maudsley. It seems a fair inference that the current happier Eng-
lish situation has resulted, in part, from the fact that English psychiatrists have
taken pains to understand the criminal law and its administration.
122. E.g., Barnes, supra note 70 at 316-317.
123. Id. at 316.
.124. 9 C. & P. 546, 173 Eng. Rep. 950 (1840).
125. Barnes, su pra note 70, at 309.
126. Quoted id. at 317. Another like instance is Judge Bray's decision in Rex v.
Fryer, 24 Cox C. C. 403, 405 (1915). Oppenheimer quotes from two unreported
English cases where, apparently, the "irresistible impulse" test was adopted. Op. cit.
supra note 71, at 27.
127. 16 Cr. App. R. 164 (1922).
128. Hewart, C. J., in Kopsch, 19 Cr. App. R. 50 (1925).
129. 57 H. L. DEB. (5th ser. 1924) 466. See Smaouo, MENs REA (1914) 200-206.
130. The history and recommendations of these commissions is summarized by
Davies, Irresistible Impulse ii; English Law (1939) 17 CAN. B. REv. 147.
131. (1923) Cmd. 2005.
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the Medical Association and those of the Medico-Psychological Associa-
tion-the lawyers going farther in the way of proposed reform than the
doctors but not so far as the psychiatrists. The Committee's chief recom-
mendation *ias to add to the M'Naghten Rules a provision recognizing
"irresistibility" of conduct "when the act is committeed under an impulse
which the prisoner was by mental disease in substance deprived of any
power to resist.' 32 This proposal, despite its ambiguity, was interpreted,
as it was probably intended to be, as representing the "irresistible im-
pulse" test (i.e., "mental disease" was probably intended to refer only to
the volition, the intelligence being assumed to remain unimpaired).
Shortly thereafter, an appropriate bill was introduced and argued in the
House of Lords, 3 3 where it was committed to a swift demise and with-
drawn. In the debate, participated in by such notable judges as Haldane,
Hewart, Darling and Dunedin, the arguments against the "irresistible
impulse" test, long crystallized by then, were vigorously put. They were:
an "irresistible impulse" does not and cannot exist concomitantly with
unimpaired knowledge of right and wrong.134 Nextly, it was argued that
even if it be assumed that such an impulse existed, it could not be dis-
tinguished from a resistible, but unresisted impulse. Further, the dif-
ficulty of proof, particularly before a jury, was noted. Important ques-
tions of policy were also stressed, e.g., "insanity" was characterized as
a rich man's defense. "Almost invariably" an expert could be found who
would testify that an impulse was irresistible. The test would therefore
become a subterfuge, hence its adoption would be dangerous to the pub-
lic safety. Finally, it was urged, "If you pass this . ..you will make
irresistible an impulse which now is resistible and resisted because of the
penal law."'u 5 The above issues of fact and policy, comprising a sum-
mary of the questions raised by the proposed "irresistible impulse" test,
must be carefully appraised.
The argument that experts could invariably be employed to testify
that an impulse was "irresistible" might seem to cast aspersion upon an
honorable profession. But it is probable that the Judges were not raising
any question of integrity, but were instead considering the uncertainties
of psychiatry and the existence of many "schools" as major factors in
the availability of such testimony. Supplementing the writer's discus-
132. Id. at 21.
133. 57 H. L. DEB. (5th ser. 1924) 443.
134. Cf. "For myself I cannot see how a person who rationally comprehends the
nature and quality of an act, and knows that it is wrong and criminal, can act
through irresistible innocent impulse." Brannon, J., in State v. Harrison, 36 W. Va.
729, 742, 15 S. E. 982 at 990 (1892).
135. Cave, 57 H. L. DEB. (5th ser. 1924) 476. Cf. Keedy's summary of the
reasons for American courts' opposition to the "irresistible impulse" test in (1917)
30 HARv. L. Rav. 536, 546-548.
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sion above concerning these matters, it is significant to consider the
avowed attitude regarding "irresistible impulse," held by certain promin-
ent psychiatrists, one of whom wrote, "From the psychological point of
view, the impulse could not have been resistible, since the act was carried
out in accordance with the impulse. It is difficult for me to conceive of an
impulse which is resistible but not resisted."'13 6 Obviously such a theory
would lead precisely to the situation regarding expert testimony, which
the Judges sought to avoid.13 7 It may be urged that the availability of ex-
pert testimony is not peculiar to the defense of "irresistible impulse" but
applies generally. In a sense this is certainly correct, but it is nonethe-
less also true that the dangers are greatly magnified as regards "irresist-
ible impulse" because of the nature of the proof. With reference to the
issues formulated by the M'Naghten Rules,' collateral evidence regarding
the defendant can be shown whereby the experts' opinions can be evalu-
ated. But in this respect, there is a very serious limitation on the "irresist-
ible impulse" test.
The opposition to the "irresistible impulse" test on this gr6und has
been countered by insistence that "it is no less difficult to prove lack of
knowledge;'13 8 but the supporting argument for reliance on the experts' 39
reveals that the problem of proof of "irresistible impulse" has not been
sufficiently clarified by either side. In order to state the issues precisely,
it is essential to keep in mind that the "irresistible impulse" test postu-
lates the concomitant unimpairment of the intelligence. Only then can
one appraise the contention that proof of "irresistible impulse" must rest
on a distinctive foundation, and that the existence of such a compulsion
is very difficult, perhaps impossible, to establish. The reason is only
136. ZiLB0ooG, op. cit. mpra note 26, at 274.
137. See, in this connection, the interesting article by Karpman, Widening the
Concepts of Insanity and Criminality (1942)' 4 J. CR. PSYCHOPATH. 129, the import
of which can only be suggested here. The author, a recognized psychiatrist, relates
that a certain lawyer wished to retain him (having heard that he was "extreme")
to testify in behalf of a client charged with bigamy. "He told me that he had con-
sulted other psychiatrists but that they had refused to take the case as they did not be-
lieve the man was insane." The accused, a married man and a repeated offender,
had married a girl who was "a high grade mental defective" because she was the
daughter of a very wealthy man. The psychiatrist interviewed the accused. He
writes: ". . . after examining him I could not find, according to his narrative, a
single thing wrong with him .... However, after a number of interviews, it became
apparent ... that I was dealing with an undoubted case of ... constitutional psy-
chopathy .... I went to court and testified on his behalf. I pleaded before the jury
that the term 'insanity' should be understood in its widest sense, as related to prob-
lems of misconduct and maladjustment over which the individual has no control . . .
because he is emotionally so confused [The instant case sfiowed a calculated court-
ship by an experienced confidence-man.] that even though he knows intellectually
the difference between' right and wrong, and indeed is most anxious to do the right
instead of wrong yet is driven by peculiar derangement of his emotions to do the
wrong (neuroses)." Id. at 129-131. The inexpert jury found the accused "guilty" 1
138. GLUECK, op. cit. supra note 4, at 233-234.
139. Id. at 235.
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suggested in pointing out that reliance must be placed very largely upon
the testimony of the accused, and that his own account of his condition
would, at best, be self-serving; it would, besides, be highly inadequate--
if Freud's theory of the unconscious is valid. But the principal difficulty
in the way of such proof is a logical one. "Irresistible impulse" is said to
denote a disease of the volition, the only evidence of which disease is an
act whose import constitutes the chief issue. Thus, a certain act (com-
mission of the harm charged) is alleged to have been irresistibly im-
pelled; but if the evidence of its irresistibility is inquired for, all that can
be adduced, on the necessary postulate of concomitant unimpaired intel-
ligence, is the act, itself.
It is usual "to rely on kleptomania as the chief support 1"0 of the
validity of the "irresistible impulse" theory as well as to establish the
feasibility of proof, but it is plain on examination of the cases, that such
dependence is invalid. For the cases which seem to treat kleptomania as
a form of "irresistible impulse" reveal that invariably there was evidence
of numerous prior like acts. In no case was "a single instance" of a
theft held the manifestation of an "irresistible impulse." On the con-
trary, as Judge Gibson perceived long ago, "It ought to be shown to have
been habitual, or at least to have evinced itself in more than a single in-
stance."' 41 But mere repetition tends to prove habit, not abnormality. Ac-
cordingly, a much more important consideration is that the cases that
recognize kleptomania as a defense include, also, substantial evidence of
disease of the intelligence.142 Even if it be assumed that the theory of
"irresistible impulse" were valid (so that proof of diseased intelligence
could be dispensed with) it could only be established after a series of
like compulsive acts had occurred. In terms of practicability, this would
mean the exclusion of "irresistible impulse" from application to the very
crimes where the insanity plea is most frequently raised; even if it were
possible for a multiple killer to avoid apprehension for his earlier homi-
cides, the most ardent proponent of "irresistible impulse" would hardly
140. E.g., id. at 43, 304.
141. Com. v. Mosler, 4 Pa. 264, 267 (1864) ; cf. State v. Harrison, 36 W. Va.
729, 15 S. E. 982 (1892).
142. Compare the evidence supporting the defense of kleptomania when ac-
quittals were obtained: repeated thefts and concealment of women's shoes, previous
head injury, insanity in family-a typical "symbolic fetish" case, People v. Sprague,
2 Park. Crim. Rep. 43 (N. Y. 1849) ; "ungovernable habit from boyhood of taking
things," Looney v. State, 10 Tex. App. 520 (1881) ; a period of notorious pilfering
following a serious illness, Harris v. State, 18 Tex. App. 287 (1885) ; three prior
convictions for larceny, behavior "peculiar," much stolen property in possession,
idiocy among siblings, State v. McCullough, 114 Iowa 532, 87 N. W. 503 (1901).
When convictions were obtanied: defendant took eggs, grain, turkey, and colt before
instant theft of money, State v. Riddle, 245 Mo. 451, 150 S. W. 1044 (1912); no
evidence of prior instability, alcoholism, or previous thefts, State v. Berry, 179 Mo.
377, 78 S. W. 611 (1904).
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relish the task of obtaining an acquittal by sole reliance on a series of
past murders. Thus, solely on practical grounds, the claim of diseased
motor or inhibitory functions requires the support of evidence that is rele-
vant to the M'Naghten Rules.143 In the absence of such proof of con-
comitant diseased intelligence, it is impossible to distinguish the klepto-
maniac from the habitual normal thief because the mere repetition of
harmful acts can not sustain any inference as to mental abnormality. For
these reasons of advocacy and logic, it is common to support the claim
of irresistibility by showing that the act was spontaneous, i.e., without
deliberation, that it was not motivated rationally, that it was committed
under great likelihood of being detected, in short, by showing a severe
impairment in intelligence.
But the ultimate challenge to the "irresistible impulse" theory is
the direct and complete denial of its validity on empirical grounds. Al-
though, as seen, expert opinion is here divided'4 it is probable that most
psychiatrists reject the "irresistible impulse" theory.145 There are im-
portant reasons for crediting their skepticism. We need not stress the
usual grounds for such opposition, i.e., the uncertainties of both facts
and relevant knowledge, but may attend more profitably to that phase of
the theory that postulates concomitant, unimpaired intelligence. It is
probable that this hypothesis, long entertained by many psychiatrists,
results from their observation of many psychotics, especially of their ap-
parent logical skill, mental astuteness and the like. If these psychiatrists
have been mistaken in their diagnosis, a fundamental revision of the
prevailing psychopathology is required. One step in the direction of such
revision was taken by Healy and others who destroyed Prichard's theory
of "moral insanity."' 14 6 If it should also be shown that the psychotics who
have been diagnosed as emotionally unbalanced, "impulsive" but intel-
lectually sound are, in fact, also seriously impaired in their rational func-
tions, then the general foundation that has supported the theory of "ir-
resistible impulse" would be seriously breached. Now it is precisely this
sort of evidence that has recently become available. Certain researches on
the intelligence of schizophrenics and other psychotics have revealed
that although.these patients were normal in their concrete responses, "the
143. Recent Irish decisions are based on the ground that no evidence of "irre-
sistible impulse" was introduced. See Attorney General v. O'Brien, [1936] Ir. R.
263, Attorney. General v. Boylan, [1937] Ir. R. 449, 456 and People v. Fennell,
[1940] Ir. R. 445, 449.
144. See notes 98, 99 and 10? supra.
145. See note 99 supra. For other summaries of, and citations to, expert opinion
opposed to the "irresistible impulse" theory, see Waite, Irresistible Impulse and
Criminal Liability (1925) 23 MIcH. L. REv. 443, 455-456, 466 fn., 468; and Whit-
man, Capital Punishment and Irresistible Impulse as a Defense (1929) 5 NoTm
DAM LAWYER 188, 195.
146. See supra p. 691.
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characteristic defect . . .was an impairment of the capacity for ...
'abstract behavior.' "147 These discoveries support other like findings of
recent psychiatric mental testing.148 These clinical studies have shown,
moreover, that the deterioration in thinking is unrelated to the educa-
tion of the patient.' 49 Other clinical data support the view that in so-
called "irresistible impulses," the compulsive acts are symbols of certain
obsessions-hence they occur at moments of severe lack of correct
"reality-testing."'15 Particularly as regards kleptomania, recent studies
have shown that the claim of concomitant unimpaired intelligence is fal-
lacious. Thus a clinician reports on his studies of kleptomaniacs: "One
thing 'is certain. Every patient who has been investigated extensively
showed some faults in critical appreciation of the factors of reality."'u '
It is plain that these recent discoveries are of the utmost significance
since they indicate (and give promise of definitely establishing) that the
traditional diagnosis that the intelligence remains unimpaired in most
psychotics -is untenable. Plainly these discoveries implement the
M'Naghten Rules, just as they provide an additional ground for exclu-
sion of the "irresistible impulse" theory.
Thus an analysis of the literature on the "irresistible impulse" test
discloses prevalent particularistic fallacies. Many, like Judge Somer-
ville, who would adopt that test, quite properly insist that responsibility
rests on "free will" (the power of "self-control"; normal inhibitory
functions) ; hence they argue that a volition so diseased that it can-
not control impulse excludes the conditions of liability. A strictly
analogous position has been advanced by psychiatrists predominantly in-
terested in the instincts and emotions as the sole source of the criteria
of abnormal behavior. On the other hand some extreme defenders of the
M'Naghten Rules, who see only subterfuge 5 2 and fantasy in the pro-
posed test, are apt to ignore or minimize the affective and conative sides
147. Bolles and Goldstein, A Study of the Impairment of "Abstract Behavior"
in. Schizophrenic Patients (1938) 12 PsYcHIAT. Q. 65. Commenting on their con-
clusion, Stoddard states: "Such a defect is a tremendous failure in intelligence I"
STODDARD, THE MEANING OF INTELLIGENCE (1943) 26.
148. E.g., cf. Vigotsky, Thought in Schizophrenia (1934) 31 ARcH. N zuiO. &
PsYcHIAT. 1063.
149. Boles and Goldstein, supra note 147 and see their references at 63-64.
150. Both psychiatrists and judges have neglected "temporary insanity" occur-
ring when the harm was committed. If it be agreed that, however brief the duration
of the psychdsis, if it covered the time of the act, it should be recoghized as a de-
fense, then the condition of the rational functions during that crucial period must be
closely examined.
151. Lorand, Compulsive Stealing (1940) 1 J. CR. PsYcuOPATH. 247; cf. ".
compulsion neurosis is an intellectual disease par excellence. . . ." Gutheil, The
Criminal Complex it Compulsion Neurosis (1941) 3 J. CR. PSYCHOPATH. 253.
152. "Impulsive insanity is the last refuge of a hopeless defence." Darling, J., in
Wright, 7 Cr. App. P. 37 (1911).
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of human nature. The former groups rely on untenable faculty psycho-
logies, whereas the latter "solves" the problem by ignoring the facts.
Opposed to these views and avoiding their particularistic fallacies
is the theory of the "integration of the self," which has been suggested
above' 53 and implied in much of the discussion. In terms of this theory,
any inter-action with the environment is integrated in the sense that the
various functions of the personality coalesce and act as a unit.154 Al-
though it is useful to distinguish the important "modes" or attributes
of such action, the various functions are not actually separate. On the
contrary, the affective, the cognitive, and the conative functions, as well
as all the others, inter-penetrate one another. Thinking (knowing, under-
standing) e.g., fuses with tendencies to action and it is permeated also,
in varying degrees, by the warmth of the emotions. Inevitably, therefore,
serious mental disease impairs all aspects of the psychological organism.
Hence it is arbitrary and formalistic to assert that the psychotic's ra-
tional functions, including his knowledge of right and wrong, are unim-
paired. There is only a certain awareness, a bare calculation, unsupported
by the strong pillar of sensitivity that, in normal adults, effects identifica-
tion with a prospective victim, or stimulates a vivid imaging of other
consequences of the intended behavior; in short, the psychotic's conduct
is unaccompanied by actual understanding of the moral significance of
his action.' 5
In the context of this psychology, it is important to clarify certain
questions concerning the volitional phases of conduct, especially the na-
ture of action alleged to be irresistibly caused. The relevant psychological
problem may be restated thus: we observe certain behavior, but not any
mental state. On the basis of such observation as well as of introspec-
tion, other experience, the needs of intelligibility, and for purposes that
are relevant to the legal rules, we characterize the behavior as voluntary,
involuntary or non-voluntary; each of these is given distinctive treat-
ment in the criminal law. For present purposes, we emphasize that vol-
untary conduct (action) is a movement of the (whole) self in which in-
telligence has participated,1 6 that involuntary conduct involves coercion
153. Beginning with the reference to Aristotle's "unitary" theory of the soul,
supra pp. 687-688 and especially, p. 691.
The range of the integration theory is very extensive in modem thought. Those
phases of it that are immediately relevant to the instant problem include, of course,
Gestalt Psychology-see A SOURCE Boox OF GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY (Ellis Ed. 1938),
and the works of Sherrington, Child and Lashley; see GOLDSTEIN, THE ORGANISM
(1939). Of special interest, also, is Commins, Some Early Holistic Psychologists
(1932) 29 J. OF PHiaos. 208.
154. For a brief statement, see Glueck, supra note 106, at 167.
155. See Zilboorg's excellent discussion, supra note 14, at 552-553.
156. "The term 'will' has come to stand for the sum total of processes which
operate within the individual in reaching a ddecision or making a choice." SxAGOs,
THE MAJOR FoRms OF INHIBITIoN IN MAN (1931) 85.
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and is a "mixed act," whereas non-voluntary behavior denotes move-
ment caused solely by physical force. Considerable uncertainty regarding
the theory of "irresistible impulse" has resulted from confusing conduct
relevant to it with non-voluntary behavior. It is essential that the two
be distinguished if the meaning of the legal rules is to be understood.
Non-voluntary behavior is seen in simple reflex action-the knee-jerk,
shutting the eyelids on any contact, the functioning of the salivary glands
and the like; it is more frequently noted in legal cases with reference to
facts showing that the defendant's body was used as a physical instru-
ment by another, who, e.g., pushed him against someone-here the com-
mon language of law and ethics is that the defendant has not "acted" at
all.1 7 Clearly the movements alleged to represent "irresistible impulses"
(e.g., kleptomania) are not non-volitional. They are not automatic re-
sponses referable to simple, fixed patterns of behavior. Instead, the di-
agnoses are in terms of emotional disturbance, lack of moral attitudes,
disassociation of the affective and rational functions, and the like. Nor is
conduct under "irresistible impulse" an internal counterpart of external
physical force, as, e.g., certain cases of epileptic seizure. The theory is,
on the contrary, that the volition functions but does so abnormally-due
to a disease of the inhibitory apparatus, alone. But if the integration
theory is valid, the correct inference is the concomitant, severe impair-
ment of the intelligence.
The integration theory is strongly affirmed by psychiatrist-critics of
the present Rules,'5 8 and this presents a very curious situation. For the
psychological hypothesis that is the foundation of the "irresistible im-
pulse" test cannot be maintained simultaneously with the theory of "the
integration of the self." The latter implies that there can be no varia-
tion in any essential element without effecting a major change in the
system. Only if persons "irresistibly impelled" to certain conduct re-
-mained "normal" could it be contended that "irresistible impulse" was
consistent with the integration theory. But the claim is precisely the
opposite; these persons are diagnosed as psychotic. The error consists
not in the recognition of disintegration (or disassociation) in psychotics
but in the contention that the pathology does not affect the total system.
On the premise of integrated personality, this contention is clearly fal-
lacious. Actually the proponents of "irresistible impulse" forget their
general acceptance of the integration theory when penal responsibility is
157. These cases and the above conceptions have been discussed at length in the
writer's forthcoming article, Necessity and Coercion i the Ciminal Law.
158. E.g., Overholser, The Role of Psychiatry in the Administration of Criminal
Justice, (1925) 93 J. A. M. A. 831. Zilboorg gives an excellent interpretation of this
viewpoint in his discussion of "knowledge," "understanding" and "defect of reason"
in terms that are directly important for the criminal !aw. Zilboorg, supra note 14, at
552-553. So, too, Prideaux, .npra note 67, at 320-321.
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involved, and they then argue on the opposite hypothesis: intelligence,
volition, and emotion are hypostatized. This inconsistency is further re-
vealed by comparison of their respective arguments concerning delusion
and "irresistible impulse." The usual praise of Erskine's speech in Had-
field's Case is tempered by criticism of his adherence to a faculty psy-
chology. There is also, and properly, severe criticism of the M'Naghten
Rules on partial insanity and delusions. Here integration of the mind is
uniformly opposed to the atomistic psychology originally represented in
the Rules. The fallacy of the view that a person is insane in one intel-
lectual function without being, at the same time, generally disordered is
uniformly emphasized by psychiatrists. But when the issue is "irresist-
ible impulse," those who would amend the prevailing law by adding this
to the M'Naghten Rules as a sufficient alternative test, forget their
earlier insistence on integration. Now they insist that many psychotics
understand the nature and quality of their conduct fully, that they are
sometimes even more sensitive than normal persons regarding ethical
principles; yet they were "irresistibly impelled" to commit the harm
charged against them. There is no escape from the above dilemma ex-
cept by consistent application of the psychological theory adopted. That
postulating the integration of the self represents, at once, one of the old-
est ideas of western civilization and one of the few theories that con-
tinues to be widely approved by psychologists generally. The essential,
specific consequence, in terms of the instant problem, is that diseased
volition does not exist apart from diseased intelligence. This was also
the conclusion reached above on the basis of recent mental testing of
psychotic persons.
Although impulsive acts cannot, alone, establish mental disease, they
may be evidence of it, if supported by facts tending to show such illness,
e.g., disordered reasoning (incorrect "abstract behavior"), acceptance of
absurd premises, grossly fallacious interpretations of the environment,
insensibility to the suffering of close relatives, serious, social maladjust-
moent, and the like. This limitation would not work hardship; if the ac-_
cused is psychotic, a spontaneous harmful act will have been preceded by
a long period of mental disease.1' 9
This sounder psychological theory is far from being unknown-i in
the criminal law, e.g., the traditional handling of sudden, motiveless acts
as indicative of disordered intelligence. Among modern writers, this
theory was very well stated by Stephen, but his analysis shows hesitation
and confusion, resulting from his having been greatly influenced by
159. "It is rare to see true cases of mental disorder where a crime has been the
first evidence of it. In practically every bona fide case there is a history pointing
definitely to mental disturbance over a considerable period of time previous, to the
criminal act."' Henderson, rupra note 15, at 113.
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Griesinger and Maudsley; hence he advocated reform of the Rules by
the addition, in the disjunctive, of the "irresistible impulse" test.1 10 But
almost simultaneously, he argued that "the absence of the power of self-
control would involve an incapacity of knowing right from wrong ...
It is as true that a man who cannot control himself does not know the
nature of his acts as that a man who does not know the nature of his
acts is incapable of self-control."'' Thus he did not press this valuable
insight to the point of recognizing that the theory of "irresistible im-
pulse" was definitely inconsistent with it; he merely expressed doubts
regarding his proposal to add that test as a sufficient alternative.1 2 In
an American opinion, written shortly after the publication of Stephen's
History, judge Brannon repudiated Stephen's proposed reform but
recognized the significance of his discussion of the integration theory.0 3
A number of recent opinions reveal a like understanding. One of the
most apt of these was Justice Greer's statement in the appeal of True:
"What I really told the jury was that the definition of insanity in
criminal cases was the one laid down by the judges in McNaughton's
Case, but that men's minds were not divided into separate compartments,
and that if a man's will power was destroyed by mental disease it might
well be that the disease would so affect his mental powers as to destroy
his power of knowing what he was doing, or of knowing that it was
wrong."'164 The importance of this approach to amendment of the Rules
has been recognized.1 5 In order, however, to understand the problem
of reforming the Rules it is necessary to place the theories of the
psychiatrist-critics of the law in a more general context, and thus facili-
tate a valid application of the conclusions reached in the above analysis.
Psychological Determinism and Penal Responsibility
It has been suggested above that the ultimate basis of the criticism
of the criminal law by certain psychiatrists is not any established body
of empirical knowledge but is, instead, a philosophy whose chief tenet
160. 2 H. C. L. (1883) 148-149. ,
161. Id. at 171. Oppenheimer regarded "Stephen's attempt to read the latter
faculty into the term 'knowledge' . . . a hopeless failure." OPPENHEIMER, Op. Cit.
supra note 71, at 142, 33. It is thus evident that Oppenheimer misunderstood the in,
tegration concept. Stephen nowhere equates "knowledge" with "control," nor does
he say that the latter is a form of the former. His argument was that the two powers
were integrated, so that one could not be essentially disturbed without impairment of
the other.
162. 2 H. C. L. (1883) 149; DIGEST oF THE CRIMINAL LAW (1887) Art. 27.
163. State v. Harrison, 36 W. Va. 729, 15 S. E. 982 (1892).
164. Rex v. True, 16 Cr. App. R. 164, 167 (1922). Similar views were well ex-
pressed in a recent Australian case, Sodeman v. The King, 55 C. L. R. 192 (1936)
among them, Evatt, J.: "It is quite out of accord with modern research in psychology
to assert an absolute gap between cognition and conation." Id. at 227. Sce Barry,
Insanity in the Criminal Law in Australia (1943) 21 CAN. B. REV. 427, 435, 437,
165. DAvis AND WnsSHME, op. cit. stipra note 69, at 113.
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is determinism. As to this, there need not be the slightest conjecture;
the writings of these critics speak abundantly to the point: "It [psy-
chiatry] is dominated by a belief in psychological determinism, in other
words, by the belief that in the psychological sphere, as well as fit the
purely physical, whatever takes place can be explained by what went
before and out of which it developed."' 6 6 Conforming to this doctrine, an-
other vigorous psychiatrist-critic of the criminal law denies the respon-
sibility of any criminal; he considers any crime a "pathological phenome-
non.'' x°7" In elucidation of this position, a distinguished psychiatrist
said:
"I cannot do better than to quote Rosanoff to summarize the views held by
our American psychiatrists. He states: 'The phenomena of the will like other
natural phenomena are subject to natural laws and are determined by anteced-
ents; . . . responsibility, therefore, . . . does not exist scientifically in any case,
sane or insane. . . . The scientific point of view presupposes an irrevocable
commitment to the concept of determinism in nature, as an article of faith.'"
And he adds: ". . . I accepted the view of psychic determinism 'as an article
of faith. . .. '" His conclusion is that, "In place of guilt and responsibility, we
should have the concept of causal responsibility.... The determinist can
make no distinction between the killing of a human being through criminal
violence or through the toxines of a tubercle bacillus."
It is obvious that we here confront a definite philosophy, indeed, that
the Positivism of Lombroso and Ferri has been explicitly embraced by
these rigorous psychiatrist-critics of the criminal law even more ar-
dently than it was by criminologists in the recent past. It is equally plain
that this theory is even less defensible in psychology than it was in
sociology.
In considering the theory of psychological determinism, it should
be noted, firstly, that its proponents are less consistent in its espousal
than in any other phase of their work. Thus, typically, a Committee of
the American Psychiatric Association, after asserting that "the psy-
chiatrist cannot, however, make affirmations or denials with respect to
metaphysical . . . matters ['responsibility'] concerning which he does
not have scientific information," nonetheless proceeded in its very next
sentence to define this unknown "metaphysical" term.6 9 So, too, a
166. W TE, op. cit. mpra note 9, at 27.
167. ZImBOORG, op. cit. supra note 26, at 282. Cf. "Man is pre-destined by an-
thropological, social, and physical causes to violate the law ... ." Belbey, Psycho-
analysis and Crime (1943) 4 J. CRim. PsYcHoPAT.Ur. 639, 647.
168. Brill, Determinism. in Psychiatry and Psychoanalysis (1938) 95 Am. J.
PsycHiAT. 597, 600, 609.
169. "This probably means the capacity to change one's conduct in response to the
direction of certain painful associations and the legal notion implies a power of voli-
tional reasoning with respect to a contemplated act and the capacity to withhold from
that act when and because it is known to be considered wrong legally and morally."
Menninger, supra note 48, at 374.
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distinguished psychiatrist, quoted above, while advocating the "discard-
ing of the concept of responsibility" as meaningless when he" discussed
the criminal law,170 did not hesitate elsewhere to attempt a detailed ex-
planation of its meaning.171 A single specific instance of a typical oc-
currence illustrates the tangled web of sophistry woven by psychiatrists
whose criticism of "responsibility" purports merely to represent a neces-
sary scientific postulate. In a report on Robert Irwin, tried for a triple
murder in New York, a Commission of three highly qualified psychia-
trists presented their conclusion in language relevant to the rules on
penal responsibility, thus indicating, incidentally, that they could under-
stand the legal terminology in its references to psychiatry and could re-
state it in simple language.172 This collaboration aroused the ire of one
of the vigorous psychiatrist-critics of the law. He criticized his con-
freres very severely because they had used the language of "judicial
casuistry, their criteria are those the letter of the law. . . .,3 Then
this unrelenting critic of penal responsibility said, "It is obvious that
the responsibility is that of the jurist and not of psychiatry; psychiatry
cannot share this responsibility. . . .Therefore, in the discharge of his
medical ... duties, the psychiatrist is within his moral and scientific
right to disregard the psychiatric excursions of the law. . . .,1 Thus
"responsibility," reduced to a futile, metaphysical archaism when em-
ployed in the criminal law, in a sense as old as western civilization, is
resurrected and embraced when the critics forget their special plead-
ing 1175 Rather obviously it has never occurred to them to "determine"
what determines their Determinism, or to consider whether any sig-
nificance whatever could be attached to their criticism of the criminal
law or, for thai matter, to any other problem-solving, if that dogma were
consistently maintained. 7 6
170. White, supra note 8, at 504.
171. WHIT, op. cit. supra note 9, at 98.
172. "It seems clear to the Commission . . that Irwin not only knew and un-
derstood the physical nature and quality of his acts when he took the lives of his vic-
tims, but knew that the acts were forbidden by law and had sufficient intelligence and
understanding to know and did know that the murder of a human being was forbidden
by accepted standards of human conduct and morality." Report of Cosmuissioners in
Linacy (1938) 95 Am. J. PSYCHIAT. 219,224.
173. Zilboorg, supra note 14, at 548.
174. Id. at 541.
175. Cf. this same "determinist's" description of the medical profession:
we physicians ...do not defend ... a remedy which has outlived its usefulness.
We reject it; we substitute it. by others; we try new remedies, revive and modify old
ones if necessary. We are singularly radical and free. . . .I must admit that we are
the freest group in the world. . . ." ZILBOORG, op. cit. supra note 26, at 279.
176. Accordingly, if the psychiatrist-critics of the criminal law assert that their
chief objective has been to demonstrate the invalidity of the fundamental principles of
that law, and especially those concerning responsibility, this may be granted. But it
is obvious that these principles represent basal value-judgments, and that, consistently
with their own philosophy, these psychiatrists can do no more than assert that they
prefer their own "attitudes"-they cannot, on their premises, even attempt to inval-
idate the ethical principles that support penal responsibility.
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The psychiatrist-critics of criminal responsibility are ardent
Freudians, and Freud's system, built on biological theories of the past
century, purported to be rigorously scientific. The formation of the
instinctual drives, the pleasure-pain principle, the conflict between id
and super-ego, repression and sublimation, etc. were all conceived as
operating in accordance with universal laws of causation. In the recent
past many psychiatrists have repudiated the naturalistic dogmas of
Freud. As noted above, in analysis of the "right and wrong" test, they
disagree especially with the Freudian disparagement and neglect of the
moral judgment.'1 7 Jung was among the first of the psychoanalysts to
stress the paramount importance of moral attitudes for any sound psy-
chology378 Another critic writes that "Freud's causal interpretation of
the analytical situation .. . amounts to a denial of all personal au-
tonomy in favor of the strictest possible determinism, that is to say, to
a negation of life itself. ' 179 A very scholarly psychiatrist censures
Freud "for having attempted to swallow up morality in psychotherapy,
and for thus coming to maintain that energy and will have no place in
the total conduct of the normal man."18 0 As to Freud's rejection of a
"capability of discriminating between good and evil," this distinguished
critic emphasizes that "This denial- amounts to the destruction of reason.
It is inconceivable that one can deny that man, from the mere fact that
he uses his intelligence, is capable of perceiving that two different types
of conduct have a different value." 1'u The Freudian system, applied un-
critically in condemnation of penal responsibility, depreciates rational
conduct, partly by stressing the primacy of instinctual drive, partly by
admitting only expediency as a conditioner of the libido. Such a dogma
177. For a recent presentation of this naturalistic viewpoint, see Schroeder, Atti-
tude of One Amoral Psychologist (1944) 31 PSYCHOANAL. RaV. 329-333.
178. Jung gives as a specific reason for breaking with Freud, his (Jung's) percep-
tion that "behind the confused deceptive intricacies of neurotic phantasies, there stands
a conflict, which may be best described as a moral one." JUNG, ANALYTICAL PSYCHOL-
OGY (trans. Long 1922) 242.
179. RANK, BEYOND PSYCHOLOGY (1941) 278; cf. id. at 34. Cf. "As a matter of
fact, when he calls psychoanalysis a re-education Freud contradicts his own ideal,
succumbing to the illusion that education is conceivable without at least implicit
moral measuring rods and goals." HoRNEY, Nav WAYS IN PSYCHOANALYSIS (1939)
297; cf. id. at 10-11, 237, 292-293.
180. 2 DALBIEZ, PSYCHOANALYTICAL METHOD AND THE DOCTRINE OF FREUD(1941) 265. And he adds, ". .. we may search in vain for the will in the picture of
the psychism which he has sketched for us .... [yet] The end of treatment is the
return to normality, to the possibility of using the will." Id. at 295.
181. Id. at 301. So, too, KAmDiNER, THE INDIVIDUAL AND His SocIETY (1939)
407; ALLERS, THE SUCCESSFUL ERROR (1940) 111-112; and note the remarks by
Schilder, Altschuler, and Alexander in reply to Brill's exposition of determinism,
supra note 168, at 617-619.
A recent biographer of Freud reports that he had a very high appreciation of
moral values, but that they were "self-evident"; that man also had instinctual drives
was what needed telling. WAELDER, THE LIVING THOUGHTS OF FREUD (1941) 16-18.
Such a gap between the man and the scholar's ptblications is not uncommon; in the
present instance this merely re-enforces the above criticism.
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is not only incompatible with the enduring truths embodied in the
M'Naghten Rules; it is also inconsistent with the implications of the vast
structure of science and the theories of the psychoanalysts, themselves.
182
Although Freud insisted on absolute conformity to the "scientific
outlook on the world"' 83 and expressed "sharpest opposition" to the
"illusion of psychic freedom,"'1 he realized, as many of his followers
have failed to appreciate, that scientific explanation broke down even in
diagnosis. "So long," he wrote, "as we trace the development from its
final stage backwards, the connection appears continuous. . . .But if
we proceed the reverse way, if we start from the premises inferred from
the analysis and try to follow these up to the final result, then we no
longer get the impression of an inevitable sequence of events that could
not be otherwise determined. We notice at once that there might have
been another result .. ."I85 This presents the precise question of fact
upon which legal responsibility turns; the jury is compelled to face this
very question of the condition of the defendant at the time he committed
the harm. They must view the problem neither as historians, tracing a
chronology between given points nor as analysts interested in the step-
by-step process from a given maladjustment to various preceding events,
viewed as causes; the judge and jury~must look forward from a point
immediately preceding the commission of the act, and decide, as best
they can, those factual questions that are relevant to the adjudication.
Such an appraisal, however informed by case histories, always involves
the tenable assumption that, for normal persons, the commission of a
harm was not unavoidable. Certainly errors are committed in the de-
termination of these questions, but the same difficulties limit the validity
of psychoanalytic therapy. It is the disparity between the psychiatrist-
critics' tolerance of vast uncertainty in psychiatry and their simultaneous
assumption that "the law" can, nonetheless, become quite certain, that is
unfortunate.
It is when they concern themselves with punishment that the psy-
chiatrist-critics of the law disclose their philosophical predilections most
definitely. Here the claim of scientific indifference to justice 80 is for-
gotten, and the psychiatrist of this persuasion sallies forth as the most
confident and aggressive of contemporary social positivists. The slogans
are the familiar ones: The criminal law represents "vengeance [which]
182. Freud himself wrote: "The voice of the intellect is a soft one, but it does not
rest until it has gained a hearing." FREUD, TE FuTURE ON AN ILLUSION (1928) 93.
See, also Alexander's article, entitled "The Voice of the Infellect is Soft . . .(1941) 28 PSYCHOANAL. REv. 12.
"183. INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON PSYCHOANALYSIS (1920) 38.
184. Id. at 37-38.
185. Quoted in 2 DALBiEz, op. cit. supra note 180, at 299-300.
186. ". . . the psychiatrist is npt in the least interested in justice, and perhaps
even doubts its existence. . . ." Menninger, supra note 48, at 372.
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still functions but under a disguise, namely the disguise of deterrence.
S. .,18 All crime is a "pathological phenomenon" ;188 hence "the time
will come when stealing or murder will be thought of as a symptom, in-
dicating the presence of a disease. . "189 An obvious corollary is that
"all moral issues should be discharged from consideration . .. anti-
social conduct should be considered as dispassionately as a broken leg.
.. .-190 Lombroso is hailed for his "epoch-making work," especially
for his substitution of "social defense".for punishment.191 "Dangerous-
ness" must replace "the vague concept of the magnitude of the guilt"
and it "alone should be the standard for the kind, and duration of the
treatment."'
1 92
This theory of punishment has ' been analyzed elsewhere by the
writer.193 In the present context, it should be added, firstly, that the
above positivistic theory of "treatment" does not represent the views of
psychiatrists who have had experience in the administration of the crimi-
nal law.' 4 Of greater interest from a theoretical viewpoint is that psy-
choanalysis has shown rather persuasively that punishment is necessary
for the "public sense of justice," i.e., to preserve the delicate balance be-
tween instinctual drive and the super-ego.9 ) This supports the theory
that punishment reinforces the moral attitudes, as well as Stephen's in-
sight into the function of the criminal law as a salutary channel of ret-
187. White, mtpra note 8, at 502.
188. ZMLBOORG, op. cit. supra note 26, at 282.
189. Menninger, supra note 48, at 373.
Cf. "Leaving to one side such uninformed judgments as those proclaiming that
all criminals are insane or feebleminded, or that criminality is a diseased condition
of the human character, or that the criminal is a psychopath whose dominant pas-
sion is to commit a crime, it has been found that some of those 3vho commit crimes
are mentally disordered." Lowrey, in supra note 65, at 805.
190. White, supra note 8, at 503.
191. Overholser, supra note 158, at 830, 834.
192. Brill, supra note 168, at 609-610.
193. E.g., Nulla Poena Sine Lege (1937) 47 YALE L. J. 165, 182-185; Criminal
Attempt (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 789, at 828-831; and Criminology in 20TH CENTURY
SOCIOLOGY (Gurvitch and Moore eds. 1945). In these discussions, it was emphasized
that: it is fallacious and unreal to deal with- "justice," "deterrence," and "re-
habilitation" as mutually exclusive objectives of the criminal law of advanced sys-
tems; but if distinctions are made for purposes of analysis, then justice is plainly
the paramount objective. Deterrence, alone, is barbarism-it would punish the
insane in complete disregard of their being grievously ill-as Bramwell admitted
("I am not aware of any justice in this matter idtra expediency." Quoted by Davies,
supra note 130, at 151). Treatment designed solely to reform is also unjust if the
innocent are not excluded, if it frees those who have committed major crimes or if
it incarcerates for long periods those who have repeatedly committed only petty
transgressions. It also involves the untenable assumption that adequate empirical
knowledge is available to rehabilitate or, even, to recognize with assurance those
who can and those who cannot be reformed.
194. Campbell, Crime and Punishment from the Point of V ew of the Psycho-
pathologist (1928) 19 3. CR. L. AND Cain. 244, 251.
195. ALEXANDER AND STAUB, THE CRImINAL, THE JUDGE AND THE PUBLIC
(1931) 210-221.
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ributive emotion. From the viewpoint of a theory of just punishment
such arguments are inadequate; but the psychiatrist-critics of the law
are hardly among those able to defend their position on such grounds.
Hence they should explain how they are able to manage simultaneously
both (a) the theory that punishment is needed to maintain the public
"sense of justice," and (b) the theory that criminal behavior is always
pathological, hence any punishment is merely vengeance.10 Moreover,
in appraising the arguments of. psychoanalysts regarding treatment of
offenders, it can hardly be overlooked that psychoanalysis has been con-
spicuously weakest in its therapy.197  Its limitations as a practical ad-
junct to the administration of the criminal law have been established.'9 8
Psychiatrists experienced in criminal law administration have long
recognized the very restricted utility of psychotherapy in actual prac-
tice.1 99
If an adequate theory of punishment is to be established, the im-
perious need is to understand the complexity of the criminal law and its
administration, where norms of justice coalesce with the objective of
deterrence and an unremitting search for rehabilitation. The notion
that it is possible to administer medical and psychological treatment with-
out, at the same time, applying punishment would disappear on any ac-
quaintance with even the best asylums for mentally diseased offenders-
confinement and close supervision are punitive regardless of the attitude
of the attendants.2 1°  Just as treatment is to some extent punitive, so
punishment, if wisely administered, also rehabilitates. This perspective
does not simplify the problems of criminal law administration, but it
does aid sound solution of them. Once the complexity of modern penal
law and its administration is recognized, it becomes possible to criticize
any present defect in that law more pointedly. So, too, with the elimina-
tion of formalistic interpretations of reform, much of the present
196. It should be added that Alexander's position is much more defensible than
is that of the psychiatrists discussed above-e.g., he recognizes a large class of
"normal criminals" and the propriety of punishing them. See id. at 209.
197. Cf. Myerson,.Error in Psychiatry in THE STORY OF HUMAN ERROR (ed.
Jastrow 1936) 412; cf. Kessel and Hyman, The Value of Psychoanalysis as a
Therapeutic Procedure (1933) 101 J. A. M. A. 1612.
198. Professor Dession quite properly stresses the inadequacy of facilities to
implement the reforms advanced by psychiatrists and his discussion also clarifies the
distinctions between psychiatric functions and social and legal policies. Dession,
Psychiatry and the Conditioning of Criindal Justice (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 319; cf.
"But psychoanalytical treatment demands months, sometimes even years." Freud,
Basic Cotcepts of Psychoanalysis, in WAELDER, THE LIVING THOUGHTS OF FREUD
(1941) 41.
199. "Psychotherapy is, and is likely to remain, a specialised method of treat-
ment usefully applied to but a comparatively small number of disorders." East and
Hubert, Report on Psychological Treatment and Crime (1938) quoted in (1939)
103 JusT. P. 280, 296.
200. Cf. CLFca.C y, THE MASK OF SANITY (1941) 285.
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agitation, even regarding "irresistible impulse," would become insig-
nificant. For, in the philosophy of just punishment, the influence of
strong temptation, neurotic constitution, and unfortunate environment
are potent reasons for considerable mitigation of punishment. The
probability is, therefore, that many desirable reforms, now delayed be-
cause they are coupled with fallacious theories that challenge the very
foundations of criminal responsibilit, could be achieved in large meas-
ure if they conformed to basic legal principles.
Conclusion
The correct avenue to reform is not by way of repudiation of the
M'Naghten Rules, nor by the addition, as a sufficient alternative to them,
of an "irresistible impulse" test. It is assuredly not to be found in an
assault on the basic values embodied in and implemented by the criminal
law, nor by a formalistic pseudo-humanitarian plea to substitute "treat-
ment" for punishment and, along with the abolition of the latter, to re-
move the protection which any individual now derives from the legal
limitations on what officials can do to him. A sound grasp of what can-
not or should not be attempted carries definite implications for, and aids
to, the achievement of valid reforms.
The major, relevant conclusion of the above analysis is that the
M'Naghten Rules are sound and essential principles of penal responsi-
bility. This is an implication of the theory of the integration of the
self; so long as that theory stands, the only possible criticism of the
Rules is that, though valid and necessary, they are not sufficient. In-
deed, it is also implied in that psychological theory, that the M'Naghten
Rules are defective in lacking any reference to the emotional and voli-
tional aspects of conduct. This has long been recognized. The Rules
should therefore be amended to include explicitly what is now stated in
instructions-but only inadequately and occasionally by informed
judges.2 0 1 The amended Rules should include the present tests, but'
these should be in significant juxtaposition to a simple description of the
integration of the various functions of the personality. Such amended
Rules would continue the present emphasis on irrationality as the princi-
pal criterion of insanity, but the formulation suggested above, imple-
mented by an informed administration of the law, would provide a new
interpretation of that criterion, which would probably be approved by
most psychiatrists.20 2 Thus, no more than do the present Rules, would
the amended ones refer to all the facts that are important in the diagnosis
201. See supra p. 710.
202. "Irrationality is still accepted as a criterion of severe mental illness..
Zilboorg, The Sense of Reality (1941) 10 PSYCnOANAL. Q. 183, 184.
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of psychoses-e.g., they would obviously exclude those concerning the
origins or causes of such mental disease. Nor would they comprise a
general description of it-although data concerning all of these matters
might, of course, be relevant to the determination of questions regarding
the criteria of insanity that are included in thd Rules because they refer
to facts that are of direct, legal significance.
It is apparent that an adequate administration of such an amended
Rule depends on the efficient collaboration of lawyers and psychiatrists.
To effect such cooperation, certain doctrines need correction-those urg-
ing the substitution of the axioms of psychiatry for basic principles of
criminal law have been stressed. On the other hand, however, propo-
nents of the prevailing Rules have sometimes argued that "responsibility"
is solely a legal principle, and that psychiatrists are therefore incom-
petent to contribute to its sound determination. Responsibility, meaning
liability to punishment provided by law, is indeed, a legal-ethical ques-
tion; but it also and equally involves certain questions of fact-especially
the absence of serious mental disease. In the determination of this ques-
tion of fact, psychiatry is of the utmost importance. For the Rules are
meaningful only when related to facts, and they are adequate and well
administered only when the best available knowledge is employed to ex-
plain the facts. The contributions of psychiatry to criminal law are now
considerable; they could be greatly increased by an understanding of the
distinctive functions of each discipline. No wiser steps can be taken in
the required direction than those suggested by an awareness of the
limitations of each field. Thus, while doctrinaire psychoanalysis ignores
autonomous action entirely, the history of the criminal law reveals an
over-reliance on "freedom of the will" and an indifference to important
limiting conditions, both organic and environmental. If many psycho-
analysts recognize only egoistic adaptations to instinctual drives, it is true,
also, that judges neglect the enormous influence of the irrational in hu-
man behavior. Psychiatry can reveal a wealth of detail regarding the
development of the defendant's psychic constitution, the co6rdination or
imbalance of his various functions, the tensions and conflicts manifested
in his conduct. It can disclose segments of motivation and feeling, of
which the accused was unconscious-facts that lawyers are unable to dis-
cover. At the same time, it should not be forgotten that, as regards
penal responsibility, the obligation to discover the best available knowl-
edge, to appraise it carefully with reference to the solution of the rele-
vant legal problems and to use it correctly to that end does not rest
ultimately on the psychiatrist. Here again, in sum, the wise injunction
is to keep the expert "on tap, but not on top." When this is done, there
is no incompatibility between the basic principles of the law on penal
responsibility and a maximum utilization of psychiatry or any other em-
pirical knowledge.
